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Abstract 
We study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 legal Finnish manu-
facturing cartels whose legal status is reminiscent of e.g. the U.S Sugar Institute. One 
third of the clauses relate to raising profits; the others deal with instability through in-
centive compatibility, cartel organization, or external threats. Cartels use three main 
approaches to raise profits: Price, market allocation, and specialization. These appear to 
be substitutes. Choosing one has implications on how cartels deal with instability. Sim-
plifying, we find that cartels economize on contract clauses, cartels in homogenous 
goods industries allocate markets, and small cartels avoid competition through speciali-
zation.  
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1 Introduction  
For competition policy to be effective, we need to understand how cartels work. To this 
end, it is of first order importance to analyze what issues cartels aim to solve and how. 
Our understanding of cartel organization and operation remains inadequate even though 
it has improved through both in-depth analyses of individual cartels (Genesove and 
Mullin 2001, Asker 2010), game-theoretic modeling of cartel contracts observed in 
some of the recent exposed cartels (Harrington and Skrypacz 2007, 2011) and qualita-
tive analyses of cartel practices (Harrington 2006, Marshall and Marx 2012). A key fac-
tor inhibiting further progress has been lack of data that would allow a quantitative 
analysis of cartel contracts: that is, how do the contracts look like? Are contracts very 
similar, or not? What contracting features are used most often? Do some features of 
contracts appear together often? To address these questions calls for detailed data on the 
contracts of a large number of cartels, operating preferably in a shared institutional envi-
ronment. Through archive work, we have generated a data set that enables us to offer 
such an analysis and to provide an anatomy of cartel contracts, i.e., a list of their styl-
ized facts. 
 The anatomy of cartel contracts is important in two ways: First, by providing in-
formation on how cartels operate, it helps competition authorities decide where to allo-
cate resources for the detection of cartels and courts and legal scholars to determine the 
nature of cartel agreements (e.g., Kaplow 2011a,b and Harrington 2012). Second, it 
provides a basis for further development of cartel theory along the lines initiated by 
Harrington and Skrypacz (2007, 2011) towards models that are in line with stylized 
facts. Such models are instrumental in pushing further our understanding of how cartels 
operate, and what types of policies are likely to be effective against them. 
 Cartels have to solve two fundamental issues: How to raise and allocate profits? 
and, How to deal with the inherent instability of the cartel agreement? To better under-
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stand how these problems are solved and how the cartel contracts look like, we follow a 
four-step research approach.  
 In the first step, we collect and quantify data on cartel contracts. We define a con-
tract clause to be a binary choice, indicating whether or not a particular contracting fea-
ture is covered. A cartel contract can be described by a vector of such clauses and the 
set of possible cartel contracts define the available contract types. Using this terminolo-
gy, the received cartel literature (e.g., Stigler 1964, Harrington 2006, Marshall and Marx 
2012, chs. 6 and 7) allows us to identify 18 contract clauses. These clauses can be clas-
sified into four economic dimensions: The first economic dimension relates to how the 
cartel aims to raise profits. One third of the identified contract clauses serve this pur-
pose. The remaining two-thirds of the clauses relate to the instability of cartels and can 
be grouped into three economic dimensions: How does a cartel seek to solve the incen-
tive compatibility constraint on which economic research has very much concentrated?; 
How does a cartel organize itself and settle internal disputes?; and, How does a cartel 
deal with external threats? We expect cartels to only use those contract clauses which 
address problems they can anticipate to emerge and whose benefits exceed the costs of 
including them into the contract (see also Kaplow 2011a, pp. 758-765).  
 In the second step, we analyze the four economic dimensions, the individual 
clauses of the cartel contracts as well as their correlation structure to pin down the broad 
contracting approaches cartels use. This entails looking for contract clauses that con-
sistently appear together both within and across the four economic dimensions.  
In the third step, we scrutinize how the cartel contracts relate to the size of the car-
tel in terms of the number of members and to whether the industry produces homoge-
nous or differentiated products. Our motivation to consider the number of cartel mem-
bers is the attention it has received in the prior literature. In particular, the supergame-
models of collusion suggest that the incentive compatibility constraint is a function of 
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the number of firms in the cartel (industry), with more firms leading to the incentive 
compatibility condition being harder to satisfy. We focus on product differentiation be-
cause almost nothing is known empirically about how this industry feature is associated 
with the organization and workings of cartels, despite the attention Stigler (1964) devot-
ed to it in his seminal paper.1 
In the fourth step, we provide an exploratory analysis of the complexity and sta-
bility of cartel contracts. As far as we are aware, the prior literature is largely silent 
about them, but they are potentially important in informing policy (e.g., can relatively 
simple and short contracts sustain collusion?) as well as in furthering the economic the-
ory of cartel contracts (e.g., how often are contracts updated?). A notable study is Tay-
lor (2007), who finds little relation between industry characteristics and use of individu-
al clauses, or length of the contract.  
 To implement this four-step research approach, we have collected detailed infor-
mation on the contracts of 109 Finnish manufacturing cartels. Like the U.S. Sugar Insti-
tute analyzed by Genesove and Mullin (2001), these cartels were legal, although the 
enforceability of the contracts was unclear (see section 3). The cartels covered the 
whole national market and were registered between 1959 and 1988 by a predecessor of 
the Finnish Competition Authority. We use information from this Registry to establish 
which contracting clauses the cartels adopted. The strengths of these data are twofold: 
first, the cartels operated in the same institutional environment, removing one potential-
ly large source of heterogeneity (in contracts). Second, unlike illegal cartels, legal car-
tels do not have to worry about the consequences of explicitly writing down their 
                                               
1
 The available empirical studies (see, e.g., Levenstein and Suslow, 2006, for a review) suggest that collu-
sion mostly occurs in homogenous goods industries, but the small theoretical literature on the effects of 
product differentiation on collusion is divided on the issue.  
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agreements. We can thus “observe an unobservable”, i.e. what illegal cartels would like 
to write down, if doing so would not have adverse legal consequences.2 
 While several papers (e.g. those surveyed in Levenstein and Suslow 2006 and 
Taylor 2007 in particular) report descriptive statistics on what cartels agree on, none, to 
the best of our knowledge, takes the analysis of cartel contracts further. Our contribu-
tion is to provide an anatomy of the cartel contracts by describing the systematic pat-
terns by which collusion is pursued. 
 The first step of our research approach shows – consistent with the case studies of 
Harrington (2006), the literature review of Levenstein and Suslow (2006) and the case 
studies and theoretical modeling of Harrington and Skrzypacz (2011) – that cartels co-
ordinate on pricing and allocate markets. They also frequently use some type of a non-
competition/specialization clause, which often entails coordination on the positioning in 
the product space (i.e., who specializes on what). This appears to be more common than 
(pure) market allocation schemes. We also find that many, but not all, cartels contract 
on the incentive compatibility constraint, some aspect of their internal organization as 
well as on how to deal with external threats. 
 The second step of our research approach shows that while essentially all cartels 
agree on some mechanism to raise joint profits, they differ in how they approach this. 
By and large, we find three basic contracting approaches: The choice to agree on prices, 
to use some type of non-competition/specialization clause or to allocate markets has 
implications to the rest of the contract. For example, cartels that use allocation of mar-
kets to raise profits make heavier use of contractual clauses designed to affect the incen-
tive compatibility constraint, such as mechanisms of monitoring, enforcement and fines. 
                                               
2
 The cartels that we study were legal. We discuss the implications of this for our analysis and interpreta-
tion in Section 8.  
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If cartels use some type of non-competition/specialization clause they are less likely to 
have clauses for incentive compatibility and for organizational purposes.  
 The third step of our analysis shows that the size of the cartel is significantly as-
sociated with how the cartel seeks to raise profits. For example, the number of cartel 
members is negatively correlated with the use of the non-competition/specialization 
clause. Cartel size is also positively associated with the use of instability clauses. In 
contrast to the results on cartel size, we find that cartels in homogenous goods industries 
are more likely to use market allocation to raise profits. Furthermore, several of the cor-
relations between how a cartel raises profits and how it deals with instability are ex-
plained by the number of members and homogeneity of products. 
Finally, in the fourth step, we find some evidence that larger cartels use more 
complex contracts (measured by the number of pages and the number of clauses), as do 
cartels in industries with product differentiation. While market allocation cartels seem to 
have more complex contracts, pricing cartels change them more often. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: First, we relate our analysis to the 
previous economic literature on cartels and contracts in section 2. The institutional envi-
ronment in which our cartels operated and our data sources are described in section 3. 
We then proceed in section 4 to describe in detail the 18 contracting clauses on which 
we have collected information. We explore how cartels seek to raise profits and how 
they address the instability of the cartel arrangement in section 5. We extend this analy-
sis in section 6, where we look at how the size of the cartel and whether the industry 
produces homogenous or differentiated goods, correlate with the types of cartel con-
tracts used. In section 7, we analyze the complexity and stability of cartel contracts. 
Section 8 discusses the extent to which our empirical findings generalize. Section 9 
concludes by discussing the policy implications of our results and suggests directions 
for future theoretical work. 
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2 Related literature 
First of all, our analysis is related to the empirical research that explores the internal 
workings and organization of cartels. Second, a number of theoretical papers in eco-
nomics have explored the sustainability of collusive outcomes and the strategies and 
environments that support them. As Kaplow (2011a,b) and Harrington (2012) stress, 
this economic approach is distinct from the legal approach to collusion, which empha-
sizes the nature of mutual understanding and agreements by which collusive behavior is 
pursued. 
2.1 Internal workings and organization of cartels 
An interesting nascent empirical literature studies the internal workings of a cartel.3 
Genesove and Mullin (2001) study the U.S. sugar cartel by analyzing the documents 
from the meetings of the cartel. They show that the cartel resorted to negotiations in the 
face of contract violations rather than (directly) going for a punishment (e.g. price war). 
The cartel also came up with contractual remedies to the problems that surfaced. Asker 
(2010) studies the operations of a New York-based stamp collector’s cartel and finds 
that despite their very refined operations, the damage they caused was limited. Insight-
ful studies on individual cartels, like the ones mentioned, show that there is heterogenei-
ty in both cartel design and performance that depend on the environment. We seek to 
bridge the gap between a deeper understanding of the detailed workings of an individual 
cartel and the need to observe stylized facts that pertain to a larger sample of cartels, 
both of which are crucial e.g. in designing the right policies. 
 Another strand of the cartel literature studies samples of cartels. Suslow (2005) 
studies the relation between formal cartel contracts and the structure and durability of 
cartels using a sample of legal cartels, finding that uncertainty in the operating environ-
                                               
3
 A much larger literature studies the behavior of individual cartels. Prominent examples are Pesendorfer 
(2000), Porter and Zona (1993, 1999) and Röller and Steen (2006). 
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ment is inversely related to the stability of cartels. Taylor (2007) analyses the cartel 
codes from the National Industrial Recovery Act for cartels registering between 1933 
and 1935 in the US and finds that high complexity of cartel codes (contracts) was corre-
lated with slower output growth, indicating that cartels were successful in restraining 
output. He also tabulates contract characteristics, but has fewer of those than we, and 
does not proceed to a systematic analysis of how the contracts look like. Levenstein and 
Suslow (2011) are close to us in having collected information on comparable contract 
characteristics of cartels; in their case, of illegal international cartels. Like Taylor 
(2007), they consider them as determinants of an outcome, in their case of cartel dura-
tion. We build on these recent papers and their predecessors (see, e.g., Fraas and Greer 
1977, Hay and Kelley 1974 and Posner 1970) by bringing new data on legal cartels that 
share a common institutional environment, to bear on a less-studied aspect of cartels, 
the anatomy of cartel contracts. We extend the existing work by offering a framework 
for analyzing and describing cartel contracts from an economic point of view, and by 
analyzing these contracts in detail. The earlier papers have not focused on the broader 
attributes of how collusion is organized, nor characterized the relative importance of 
various incentive compatibility conditions and other contractual features across the dif-
ferent forms of collusive schemes. 
The received theoretical literature suggests that cartel formation and stability 
should typically be inversely related to the number of market participants and cartel 
members, but empirically that seems not to always be the case (Levenstein and Suslow, 
2006). Even less is known about how product differentiation is associated with the or-
ganization and workings of cartels. The empirical literature does suggest that collusion 
mostly occurs in homogenous goods industries (see e.g., Levenstein and Suslow, 2006), 
but the theoretical literature addressing the same question portray a more mixed picture. 
Chang (1991) and Ross (1992) find that differentiation makes collusion easier, while 
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Raith (1996) and Häckner (1994) find the opposite.4 Thomadsen and Rhee (2007) show 
that costs of maintaining collusion increase the difficulty of sustaining collusion more 
for firms in industries with product differentiation. 
2.2 Collusive outcomes and cartel agreements  
Building on the seminal work of Stigler (1964), the economic theory of collusion focus-
es on outcomes, such as the level of sustainable collusive prices and quantities, and the 
importance of monitoring, communication and punishment for cartel stability in various 
environments. For example, economic theories of legalized cartels, as Athey and Bag-
well (2001) call them, assume that the colluding firms can make transfer payments and 
that such payments can be supported by enforceable contracts. Examples of these papers 
include Roberts (1985), Cramton and Palfrey (1990) and Kihlström and Vives (1992). 
These models show that when there is private information about production costs, a 
mechanism of communication is needed for the efficient allocation of production among 
the colluding members and that transfer payments can be used to ensure truthful com-
munication. Athey and Bagwell (2001) show that when pricing decisions are public (but 
costs not) and when competition policy prevents the use of transfer payments, firms 
may resort to market-share favors to ensure truthful communication of costs (see also 
Athey and Bagwell 2008). Building on Athey and Bagwell (2001), Hörner and Jamison 
(2007) show that collusion can also emerge without communication. This model pre-
dicts that in a limited-information environment, colluding firms aim at agreeing both on 
prices and markets shares and that a violation of the collusive agreement in either di-
mension triggers a punishment. Aoyagi (2002), Hanazono and Yang (2007) and Gerlach 
(2009) provided related analyses, but focus on the exchange of information about de-
mand.  
                                               
4
 Deneckere (1983), Majerus (1988), Rotschild (1992), Ross (1992), Häckner (1994), Raith (1996), Lam-
bertini and Schultz (2003) and Schultz (2005) study closely related models and questions. 
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 More recently, Harrington and Skrypacz (2011; see also their 2007 paper) have 
analyzed the properties of an equilibrium that qualitatively match the key dimensions of 
observed cartel agreements in certain markets, and show under what conditions such an 
equilibrium exists. In their model, there is private information about prices and sales 
(but costs are publicly observable), and the colluding firms can exchange information 
about sales. The analyses of Harrington and Skrypacz suggest that a solution to the 
problem of secret price cuts is − besides price wars (Green and Porter 1984) − that firms 
use transfer payments that are conditioned on the reported sales.  
 We note four things about the economic theory of collusion: First, the received 
literature stresses the importance of communication, monitoring, side-payments and 
punishments. The effectiveness of these mechanisms depends on the assumed infor-
mation structure and market environment. The broader organization of cartels is howev-
er not studied and predictions about the types of collusive schemes (e.g., price fixing, 
market allocation) or about the potential complexity of the collusive agreements are 
rarely made, even though these issues were emphasized already in Stigler (1964). 
 Second, in the available economic literature, explicit collusion calls for a degree 
of overt communication about promises, information and/or the associated arrangement. 
The boundary between tacit and explicit collusion is nevertheless not always clear-cut. 
In contrast, the legal literature on collusion is about the nature of this boundary, i.e., 
whether and when inter-firm communication is explicit enough to lead to unlawful co-
ordination (see Kaplow 2011a,b and Harrington 2012). Like ours, the interest of the 
legal scholars (and courts) has for long been in understanding the overt agreements by 
which collusive behavior is achieved.  
 The third thing to note is that the extent to which the different economic models 
are about illegal or legal coordination is a matter of degree. On the one hand, in some 
models, there is neither a competition authority nor a risk of detection, but competition 
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policy is assumed to restrict the interaction of firms in some way. These models implic-
itly assume that the forbidden actions are never taken. On the other hand, there are 
models that explicitly allow for a risk of detection and the legal consequences of taking 
an unlawful concerted action (e.g. Harrington 2004).5 
 Finally, the prior economic literature has not explicitly considered the verifiability 
of cartel arrangements in court. The theory of incomplete contracts relies on the notion 
that all possible contingencies cannot be anticipated and that not all arrangements can 
be verified by an outsider (such as a court). The theory predicts that if cartel contracts 
fall into the category of incomplete contracts, cartels should mostly agree on control 
rights, discretion and decision-making rules (Bolton and Dewatripont 2004, pp. 37). 
Moreover, the theory of endogenously incomplete contracts suggests that like legal car-
tels, illegal cartels are likely to make use of (only) those contract dimensions whose 
benefits exceed the costs of including them into the (actual or virtual) contract.6 Indeed, 
the very fact that cartels are illegal leads to endogenous incompleteness of cartel con-
tracts, because the contracting parties have a strong incentive both to reduce the ability 
of a court to verify the contracted actions and to make unverifiable what is observable. 
Bar for this difference, legal and illegal cartels have similar incentives to economize on 
                                               
5
 However, even if the legal consequences of collusion were not explicitly considered, a model may by 
applicable to unlawful collusion. This would be the case if the nature of the collusive outcome and its 
properties do not change (much) when the risk of detection is explicitly introduced. 
6
 The benefits are related to the increased collusive profits and greater stability, whereas the costs can be 
cognitive (Tirole 2009), informational (Spier 1992) or plain ink costs (e.g. Dye 1985, Anderlini and Felli 
1994, Battigalli and Maggi 2002, 2008), or some combination of the three. The theory that treats the 
completeness of contracts as endogenous has not yet settled on key determinants; see, e.g., Bolton and 
Dewatripont (2004) for a textbook treatment and Tirole (2009) and Kvaløy and Olsen (2009) for some 
more recent advances. 
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contract completeness in their attempt to coordinate on actions and meet the incentive 
compatibility constraint. 7 
 
3 The institutional environment and data 
This section describes both the institutional environment in which our cartels operated 
and our sources of data. 
3.1 The institutional environment 
The development of Finnish competition policy after the Second World War follows 
closely developments in other European countries, and Sweden in particular. There was 
no competition policy before the war (see Fellman 2008, 2010). After the war, a com-
mittee was set up in 1948 to draft a framework for competition legislation. This work 
resulted in the first cartel law which took effect in 1958. The central idea was to collect 
information on cartels that operate in the domestic market (export cartels were outside 
the scope of the Registry) rather than deter collusive activities. For this purpose, a (pre-
decessor of the) Finnish competition authority (CA) was set up and given the task to 
register cartels. The first cartel law did not precisely define what a competition re-
striction (or a cartel for that matter) means (Fellmann 2010), but the scope appears to 
have been broad. The law however explicitly outlawed only bidding rings.  
 The CA began registrations in March 1959. The Registry was active, sending out 
thousands of inquiries and registering several hundred cartels already during the first 
                                               
7
 Our research also has connections to the empirical work on contracts. Lerner and Merges (1998) study 
the allocation of control rights in alliances between US bio-technology companies and firms sponsoring 
them financially. Chiappori and Salanie (2000) use French insurance data to test for the existence of 
asymmetric information in contractual relationships. Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) explore the econo-
metric consequences of endogenous matching in the context of a contracting relationship using historical 
Italian data on contracts between landlords and tenants. In a paper that is close in spirit to ours, Kaplan 
and Strömberg (2003) use venture capital contracts in the US to investigate how well their dimensions 
map to the predictions of financial contracting theory. A difference between our paper and theirs is that 
while they could confront their empirical regularities with a rich theoretical literature on financial con-
tracting, the existing theoretical literature on the organization of cartels and cartel contracts is rather thin. 
This lack of theoretical research implies that we cannot “run a horse-race” between different theories. 
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three years of its operation. Registration was contingent on the CA contacting the sus-
pected cartel members, but the law stipulated that firms had an obligation to respond 
and inform the Registry if a competition restriction existed. This changed in 1964 when 
the law was revised. Now cartels with a formal organization (such as an association) 
had to register on their own and failing to register could result in a small fine. In 1973 
the registration requirements were again somewhat tightened. In the 1980s Finland fi-
nally edged towards a modern competition law, as the work of a committee established 
in 1985 resulted in a new law taking effect in 1988. This cumulative process of law 
changes that progressively made the environment less permissive now made void possi-
ble sanctions in cartel agreements. A primary motivation for this change was the only 
known law suit based on a cartel contract from early 1980s that had led to damages be-
ing awarded.8 This incident suggests that there was - similar to the case of the U.S. Sug-
ar Institute (Genesove and Mullin 2001, pp. 385) – a great deal of ex ante uncertainty as 
to the enforceability of these contracts in court: taking your fellow cartel member to 
court seems to have carried the risk of affecting the legal environment. Cartels became 
illegal in the beginning of 1993.  
 Our understanding of the past regime, based on written accounts and discussions 
with people familiar with the era, is that the costs of registering were minor. It also 
seems that there were some benefits tied with registering. The former and current Direc-
tor Generals of the Finnish CA (Purasjoki and Jokinen, 2001) sum up the environment 
concerning those collusive practices that were legal: “Time was such that there seemed 
no need to intervene even in clear-cut cases, especially if they had been registered. Reg-
                                               
8
 We have interviewed people with a long working history in the Finnish Competition Authority. They 
could recall only one case from the early 1980s. According to the Director General of the Finnish Compe-
tition Authority, Juhani Jokinen (private exchange), this case lead to the law change in 1988 making sanc-
tions in cartel contracts void. Note however that several of the cartel agreements stated that conflicts were 
to be solved by the parties meeting for the Finnish Chamber of Commerce. Since these arbitrations are 
not known to the public in retrospect we do not know to which extent this option was used (see also foot-
note 16). 
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istration had been transformed into a sign of acceptability of the [cartel] agreement, at 
least for the parties involved [in the cartel]”. 
3.2 Data sources 
Our data consist of information on cartel contracts, industrial statistics and macroeco-
nomic variables. They come from three sources.  
 All the data on cartel contracts is based on archive work in the Registry. For each 
registered cartel, the Registry established a folder, and gave an identification number. 
The folder contains all the correspondence between the Registry and the cartel. The 
Registry also always asked for the actual cartel contract. Once a cartel was registered, 
basic information on it was published in the Official Journal of the Finnish government. 
Thus, the Registry made cartels public. All our data on the contracts and cartels are 
based on the information available in the Registry. 
 The Registry contains in total some 900 cartels. As archive work is time consum-
ing and expensive, we could not include all of them in our sample. We decided to con-
centrate on nationwide manufacturing cartels, and chose to include the first cartel(s) in a 
given (3-digit) industry. This resulted in us going through the folders of 109 cartels in a 
very detailed manner.9 
 We used a semi-structured approach to collect information on 18 contract claus-
es.10 We discuss the clauses and other information we collected shortly. In addition to 
this information on contract clauses we collected information on the length (in pages) of 
                                               
9
 In terms of the form of the contracts, there did not seem to be a clear pattern. Thus unlike in Austria 
(private correspondence with Konrad Stahl and Christine Zulehner), registrations were not done through 
law firms, nor was a standard template (e.g. by the Chamber of Commerce) used. 
10
 After initial discussions on how to interpret contracts, we first randomly chose eight cartels and had 
four researchers go through each of them independently. We then checked for any differences in interpre-
tation, and decided on a common approach. We thereafter followed a written protocol with the 109 cartel 
contracts. 
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the contract, the number of contract changes and the number of members in the cartel. 
We collected information on the contract that was in force at the time of registration.11 
 To this data we have matched 4-digit industry statistics from Statistics Finland, 
measured in the year prior to the registration of a cartel. To measure product differentia-
tion we have constructed an index (Homogenous_d) that indicates whether an industry 
primarily produces homogenous goods (= 1) or not (= 0). We followed the existing lit-
erature (Rauch 1999, Foster, Haltiwanger, Syverson 2008) and studied the characteriza-
tion of each 4-digit industry, and the Registry’s description of the goods produced by 
the cartel to determine whether the cartel was producing homogenous goods or not.12 
Finally, our source for macroeconomic variables is the database of the Research Insti-
tute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA). We describe the industry- and macrovariables in 
greater detail in section 6. 
Our four-step research approach is summarized in Figure 1. Quantification of car-
tel contracts (step 1) is described in the next section. We identify contracting approaches 
(step 2) in section 5. We analyze contract heterogeneity (step 3) as well as complexity 
and stability (step 4) in section 6 and 7, respectively.  
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
4 Cartel contracts and contract clauses 
4.1 Quantifying cartel contracts 
A cartel contract can be described by a vector of contract clauses. Each clause is binary, 
describing whether a particular contractual feature is or is not included in the contract. 
                                               
11
 To be more precise, we also know how many times the registered contract was changed subsequently. 
However, we do not have data on the precise reasons for those changes. We therefore do not study how 
an individual contract changed over time (in contrast to e.g. Genesove and Mullin’s 2001 analysis).  
12
 To give a couple of examples, the cartel producing cardboard was classified as a homogenous goods 
cartel, while the cartel producing dairy products was classified as producing differentiated goods. We 
sought to be conservative in classifying an industry (cartel) to produce homogenous goods. An inspection 
of the industries and the classification suggests that many of the industries we classified as producing 
homogenous goods are upstream industries selling to other firms rather than directly to consumers. 
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We collected information on 18 potential contract clauses, basing our work on Harring-
ton (2006) and more broadly on the economics of cartels (e.g., Stigler 1964, Levenstein 
and Suslow 2006, Marshall and Marx 2012, chs. 6 and 7). Excluding the possibility of 
not choosing any clause (as this would result in there not being a contract), each cartel 
in our data uses one of the 218 − 1 (= 262 143) possible types of cartel contracts (i.e., 
contract types).  
 The different clauses can be classified in four economic dimensions: The first re-
fers to how the cartel affects the market outcome – raises profits. One third (6) of the 
contract clauses fall in this dimension. The remaining two thirds relate to cartel instabil-
ity. To systematically analyze these latter 12 clauses we group them further into to three 
economic dimensions. This leaves us with four dimensions: i) market power attributes 
(MPA), which describe what a cartel agrees upon to increases its profits, and three in-
stability dimensions; ii) the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC), which is about the 
different contractual ways of dealing with incentive compatibility; iii) the internal cartel 
organization (ICO) of the cartel, and iv) the external cartel contract (ECC), which is 
about dealing with external threats.  
 The upper part (Panel A) of Table 1 provides an overview on the 18 contract 
clauses, the economic dimensions to which they match and more specifically how they 
are coded. We now summarize our contract data (N = 109) in detail.  
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
MPA – Market Power Attributes 
Six of the 18 contract clauses have to do with MPA. This category includes the follow-
ing measures: Pricing, Market allocation, Efficiency, Technology, Non-price clauses 
and Non-competition/specialization. Of the 63 contracts that use Pricing, 78% agree on 
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price, 10% specify a pricing rule, 49% rules on discounts, and 48% terms of delivery.13 
Sales quotas are used by 66% of the 29 cartels using Market allocation, territories by 
28% and a home-market principle by 10% (i.e., in the latter case refrain from entering 
each other’s (geographic) “home” markets).14 As an example of an Efficiency clause, 
some contracts stipulate that the member whose facility is closest to a given customer 
should deliver the goods. Sharing of technological knowledge, such as patents or blue-
prints, is covered by Technology. Non-price restrictions are attributed to Non-price 
clauses, including things like add-ons, bundling, and quality.15 Our last MPA-clause, 
Non-competition/specialization was used by 39% (42/109) of the cartels. These clauses 
may take many forms, but often refer to a division of labor between the firms and (ge-
neric) statements not to compete.  
 The difference between a cartel having the Non-competition clause and having the 
Market allocation clause is that the former includes the parties agreeing e.g. on parti-
tioning the production of goods with one of the parties or agreeing to cease production 
of certain parts of the good in question, whereas the latter has no explicit reference to 
production, only to distribution. The cartels using Non-competition/specialization are 
not the standard textbook cartel because, after implementation, often only one of the 
parties remains active. We feel that it is justified to regard these as cartels first, because 
the transaction ensures that joint profits can be maximized and second, as the contracts 
                                               
13
 These clauses turn out to be mostly substitutes: All other correlations but that between discount rules 
and terms of delivery (0.33, p-value 0.01) are negative. Only two however are statistically significant. 
Price and pricing rule have a correlation of -0.61 (p-value 0.00) and discounts and pricing rule a correla-
tion of -0.21 (0.10). 
14
 With only 29 cartels using Market allocation, an analysis of correlations is at best suggestive: Keeping 
that in mind we find that all correlations are negative and large in absolute value: -0.21 (the home-market 
principle and territories), -0.47 (sales quotas and the home market principle) and -0.69 (sales quotas and 
territories), and all but that of the home-market principle and territories statistically significant. 
15
 We also collected qualitative evidence information on the Non-price clause. We didn’t find much, and 
the most frequent were different ways of minimizing product differentiation. For example, cartels could 
agree on standardizing products, or packages. 
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very often include non-competition clauses where the party ceasing production is not 
allowed to re-enter, nor to sell its knowledge to third parties.  
ICC – Incentive Compatibility Constraint 
We looked for four ways of dealing with ICC. Monitoring indicates whether the mem-
bers monitor each other. As an example, the plywood cartel had a clause whereby “all 
information on sales, deliveries and production must be given to the Association twice a 
month; twice a year a certified auditor's statement of the correctness of previous notifi-
cations is required”. Enforcement refers to those contracts that stipulate how to handle 
situations where a member has deviated. Such instances include the mention of price 
wars of some type, retaliation, and compensations. An example is the clause used by the 
glass cartel: “The delegation has the right to order production reductions or temporary 
closing of a plant. Compensation must then be paid”. If the cartel has rules on how to 
expel a member if rules are broken, this is captured by Expel. Similarly, for contracts 
including clauses on monetary fines for a company that violates the contract, Fine takes 
the value one. Fines were usually either a percentage of some measurable activity like 
sales; sometimes a minimum monetary fine was defined. 
ICO – Internal Cartel Organization 
The third economic dimension, ICO, is captured by five measures. Meeting identifies 
the contracts that stipulate whether, and if so, how often, the members are to meet. Dis-
pute-resolution in turn denotes whether the contract specifies a way in which disputes 
among members are to be resolved. There were two primary ways in which disputes 
resolution was specified in the contracts: either an internal mechanism, or an external 
mechanism (court, arbitration).16 Structure indicates whether the cartel has a formal 
structure, such as an association or a limited liability company to organize itself. Vote is 
                                               
16
 One solution used by cartels was to use the arbitration provided by the Finnish Chamber of Commerce, 
used e.g. by the match makers cartel after their reorganization. The Chamber unfortunately keeps the (as 
such confidential) arbitration documents for only ten years, and thus their archive would not shed light on 
whether cartel members really resorted to arbitration.  
 19 
an indicator for contracts that include a clause for a voting procedure.17 Finally, Sales 
measures if the cartel has formed either a trade or a sales association. 
ECC – External Cartel Contract 
We searched for three ECC characteristics: New members indicates whether the contract 
specifies a policy on how to accept new members. Non-cartel supply quantifies whether 
or not the cartel members have a clause on how to deal with supply from non-member 
rivals. Finally, Entry refers to a clause that stipulates how to react to entrants into the 
industry. 
 In the rest of the paper, we use these four economic dimensions, d ∈ {MPA, ICC, 
ICO, ECC} to organize the contracts and to sketch their anatomy. 
4.2 Contract usage 
We present the first descriptive statistics in the lower part (Panel B) of Table 1 (see also 
Appendix 1). The panel reports figures for how prevalent it is for a given cartel to have 
at least one clause covering economic dimension d in its contract. Almost all cartels 
(105 out of 109, or 96%) include at least one contractual measure in the MPA dimen-
sion, i.e. on how to increase profits.18 This is not very surprising given the objective of 
cartels: they must agree on at least one way to increase members’ joint profits. 
There is much more variation in the ICC, ICO and ECC dimensions. About half 
(52%) of cartels have one or more contractual clauses for ICC, which are designed to 
deal with incentive compatibility. This is a relatively low percentage relative to the 
amount of attention that the economic literature has devoted to the incentive compatibil-
ity of cartel agreements. A high percentage (85%) of cartels has at least one contract 
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 Those cartels that use the ICO clause Vote often specify the voting rules to be used:  Voting power is 
distributed according to (sales) quotas or sales (billing), using the 1-share-1-vote-rule, as relative to wages 
paid, or as a function of the size of the members. As an example, the cardboard cartel used the following 
voting rule: “Voting power is based on production (volume)”. 
18
 Of the four who do not have an MPA clause, two are in publishing, one in pharmaceuticals, and the last 
in jewelry/goldsmith products. For the pharmaceuticals cartel, agreeing on how to raise profits was prob-
ably unnecessary given that the industry was heavily regulated (including prices), although one could 
think that they could have used a Non-competition/specialization clause for example. 
  
20 
clause designed to detail cartel organization (i.e., in the ICO dimension). Finally, some 
three quarters (73%) of cartels went through the trouble of taking into account external 
threats (ECC) in their contract.  
The lower panel of Table 1 also reports descriptive statistics on the fraction of all 
possible contract clauses that cartels use in a given economic dimension of the contract, 
conditional on having at least one clause in the dimension. The first row tells us that 
those cartels that include at least one MPA-related clause in their contract use on aver-
age 30% (i.e., roughly two out of the six possible) clauses to specify how profits are to 
be increased. The fraction of clauses in the ICC dimension, conditional on usage, is 
40% out of four possible clauses. Those cartels that contractually specify something 
about how the cartel is organized use roughly half of the available five measures. Final-
ly, we find that cartels use, on average, less than half of the three contract clauses avail-
able to deal with external threats.  
Table 1 is consistent with cartels economizing on contracting and adopting an in-
complete contracting approach. Cartels appear to use the four economic dimensions 
selectively. The intensity of usage is not particularly high in any of the four economic 
dimensions, suggesting that a few contract clauses in a given economic dimension are 
deemed enough.19 This is in line with the theory on endogenous contracts which sug-
gests that cartels economize on contract clauses (see Section 2.2).  
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
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 This does not mean, say, that the 48% of cartels not using an ICC clause would not have taken care of 
the incentive compatibility of their cartel arrangement. It may merely mean that they found the costs of 
using an explicit contractual clause for the incentive compatibility higher than the benefits such a clause 
would bring. It is also possible that other dimensions of the contract made having an explicit incentive 
compatibility clause unnecessary. The cement cartel in the data may serve as an example: the two firms 
agreed on geographical market allocation. Given the locations of their production facilities, this may have 
made the use of explicit incentive compatibility clauses unnecessary as (apart from maybe at the border of 
their allocated regions), the only way to cheat on the contract on a large scale would be to open a produc-
tion facility in the other firm’s territory. This would be easy to verify. 
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To describe the data further and to shed light on the relative importance of the 
four economic dimensions, Table 2 takes a contract design to be a four-tuple {MPA, 
ICC, ICO, ECC}, where each element takes the value 1 if the contract of a cartel has at 
least one contract clause that belongs to the corresponding dimension. This means that 
for the purposes of Table 2, we view the cartels as having the choice of choosing any of 
the 15 possible combinations of the four dimensions available to them.20 As the first 
column of the table shows, only ten basic contract designs can be identified from our 
data. The next columns show that 39% (42 out of 109) cartels use the most popular con-
tract design, which covers each of the four economic dimensions. The second most 
popular one is used by 27% (29 out of 109) cartels and it covers all other dimensions 
but the ICC dimension emphasized in economic research. The three most popular con-
tract designs are all fairly comprehensive, covering at least three of the four dimensions. 
They are chosen by 73% (80 out of 109) of the cartels, which means that the distribution 
of contract designs is skewed.  
In sum, the descriptive statistics of Table 1 and 2 show that almost all contracts 
have at least one profit (MPA) clause, making it – unsurprisingly – a fundamental build-
ing block of cartel contracts. However, there is a lot of concentration and cartels use the 
remaining three economic dimensions – ICC, ICO and ECO – quite selectively.  
5 Analysis of contracting approaches 
The descriptive statistics on the basic features of the contract data suggest that we 
should take a closer look at the MPA, i.e., how cartels try to raise profits and, in particu-
lar, whether this choice has implications to the rest of the contract. This section there-
fore aims at identifying contracting approaches of cartels. We do so by looking for con-
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 There are at most 24 − 1 = 15 distinct contract designs that we could observe. The space of the contract 
designs is conditional on the number of underlying metrics and is here defined by the four economic 
dimensions.  
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tract clauses that are prevalent and that consistently appear together both within and 
across the four economic dimensions.21 
5.1 How do cartels raise profits? 
We start by taking a look at how prevalent the various MPA clauses are (Table 3) and at 
their unconditional correlations (Table 4).  
 Table 3 shows that Pricing, Market allocation, Non-competition/specialization 
and Technology are more common than Efficiency and Non-price clauses in our sample. 
Table 4 shows, in turn, that out of these more common clauses, Pricing is negatively 
(and mostly significantly) correlated with the other, more common MPA clauses. This 
is suggestive of Pricing being a gross substitute for the other MPA clauses. Market al-
location is not correlated with the other more common clauses. Finally, Non-
competition/specialization and Technology are positively correlated. This correlation 
structure can also be found once we condition on observable cartel characteristics (see 
Section 6). 
[TABLES 3 AND 4 HERE] 
 Figure 2 displays the most frequent combinations of the MPA clauses. As the fig-
ure shows, 32% of the contracts use only Pricing and 16% use a combination of Non-
competition/specialization and Technology. The third most common combination is 
Pricing and Non-price. In total, these most typical combinations are used by 62% of the 
cartels.  
[FIGURE 2] 
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 When such patterns are present, they are indicative of gross complementarities (or gross substitutabil-
ity). We use terms “gross complementarities” and “gross substitutes” to make it clear that our data are not 
rich enough for us to test explicitly for the presence of complementarities among the contract clauses. The 
clustering patterns that we find may therefore mirror real complementarities of contract clauses, affiliated 
but unobserved net returns to their adoption and/or higher order complementarities (i.e., chain reactions 
due to interaction of pairs of clauses when there are more than two endogenously chosen clauses in the 
contract); see, e.g., Arora (1996), Athey and Stern (1998) and Kretschmer, Miravete and Pernias (2012) 
for discussion.  
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 The above patterns suggest the existence of three MPA-driven contracting ap-
proaches. The three contracting approaches are built around the most prevalent MPA 
clauses, with their cores referring to Pricing (often together with Non-price), the amal-
gam of Non-competition/specialization and Technology, which are highly correlated 
with each other (we henceforth refer to this amalgam as Non-Comp-Tech), and Market 
allocation.22 Market allocation is less commonly used than Non-Comp-Tech.  
 Seen this way, we find that cartels use three main approaches to raise joint profits 
that appear to be gross substitutes. We have verified the existence of these main con-
tracting approaches using formal cluster analyses (see Appendix 2).  
5.2 How do cartels deal with instability? 
Table 5 explores whether the various instability clauses are systematically associated 
with the MPA clauses. We display the unconditional correlations of the various MPA 
clauses both with the three economic dimensions (ICC, ICO and ECC) and also with the 
individual clauses of which they consist.  
 We concentrate first on whether the contracts include any ICC, ICO or ECC 
clauses and on how this usage is associated with the main MPA clauses. As the table 
shows, the three main MPA contract clauses each have a particular correlation structure 
with the rest of the contract. Pricing and Market allocation are positively correlated 
with the use of ICC. In contrast, Non-Comp-Tech is negatively correlated with the use 
of ICC and ICO but positively with the use of ECC. As monitoring should be easier 
when agreeing not to compete or to specialize (Non-Comp-Tech), the negative correla-
tion with ICC seems natural. The unconditional correlations of the MPA clauses with 
the individual ICO, ICC and ECC clauses reveal more heterogeneity, but are broadly 
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 This view is strengthened when one compares the use of Pricing, Market allocation and Non-
competition/specialization to the use of the other three MPA clauses. Of the 105 cartels that use at least 
one MPA clause, 99% (=104/105) use at least one of Pricing, Market allocation and Non-
competition/specialization, whereas only 47% (= 49/105) use at least one of the remaining three. 
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consistent with these patterns. These findings imply that choosing one of the three main 
MPA clauses has implications to the rest of the contract and suggest three basic con-
tracting approaches. To verify this, we also tested whether the clusters (see Appendix 
2), which build around the three main MPA approaches, are statistically different in 
terms of ICO, ICC, and ECC. They are.  
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
To check that the above observations are not an artifact of how we have ap-
proached the data, we also analyze the structure of the 18 contract clauses without first 
assigning them into the four economic dimensions. In our data, only 80 unique contract 
types can be observed in the larger 18-dimensional contracting space. This confirms that 
only a small fraction of all potential contract types is used. Moreover, the most popular 
contract type in the space of 18 contract clauses is used by 8% (9/109) cartels. In line 
with our earlier analysis along the four economic dimensions, the most popular contract 
type spans all four dimensions. The second most popular contract type spans three of 
the four economic dimensions and is used by 5% (5/109) of the cartels. Again, in line 
with our previous results, but surprisingly given the existing literature, it contains no 
ICC clauses. Defining contracts to be close when they differ in at most the use of two 
clauses, we find that 31% (34/109) of the cartels use one of the two most popular con-
tracts, or contracts close to them.23  
5.3 Summary of the contracting approaches 
We find that that all cartels agree on some mechanism to raise joint profits, but use dif-
ferent approaches. The most commonly used MPA-clauses appear to be gross substi-
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 The most complicated contract uses 78% (i.e., 14 out of 18) of the contract clauses. This cartel was a 
joint sales organization of plastics manufacturers. The four clauses this cartel did not use are Non-price, 
Monitoring, Meeting and Entry. There are six cartels that only use one clause. They are: a cement cartel 
that used Market allocation (geographic territories); a cartel on manufacturing of bicycle parts (Non-
competition/specialization); a cartel on steam boiler production (Pricing); a cartel on manufacturing of 
metallic construction items (Pricing); a cartel on manufacturing of leather bags and other leather apparel 
(Pricing); and a cartel on manufacturing of made-up textile goods except wearing apparel (Pricing). On 
the other hand, the simplest contracts use only one of the MPA clauses. 
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tutes, i.e., they are not used consistently together. Moreover, choosing any one of them 
has implications to the rest of the contract: Pricing and Market allocation are positively 
correlated especially with ICC, and Non-Comp-Tech appears to have gross complemen-
tarities with ECC. This correlation structure suggests that there are three main contract-
ing approaches that cluster around the most prevalent MPA clauses.  
6 Contract heterogeneity  
In this section we study how observable cartel- and industry characteristics are related 
to the cartel contracts and to their correlation structure. We do it in two ways. First, we 
consider the observable determinants of the 18 contractual clauses. Second, we redo the 
correlation analysis of the previous section to check the extent to which the uncondi-
tional correlation structure between the various contract clauses can be explained away 
by the observables.  
6.1 Observable heterogeneity in cartel contracts and 
contracting approaches 
We report here results from Probit models where the dependent variables are the 18 
contractual clauses of which the four economic dimensions consist. These estimations 
allow us to directly study how the use of a certain contract clause is associated with ob-
servable industry and cartel characteristics.24  
 The key explanatory variables are the number of cartel members and the indicator 
that measures product differentiation (Homogenous_d) in the industry. The median 
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 We would like to point out two things about these Probit regressions: First, our analysis is related to 
Taylor (2007), who regresses cartel codes on a number of observables, such as the number of firms, in-
dustry size, available substitutes and indicator variables for homogenous goods and ease of entry. How-
ever, his focus is different. He tries to uncover whether there exists a potential bias in his sample of indus-
tries, i.e., the industries that made the choice to apply for be part of the NIRA system might differ from 
those that did not. To make sure that this is not a problem he runs Probits to see whether these industry 
characteristics indeed are correlated with the codes chosen by the cartels. The second point that we would 
like to point out about the Probit models is that an alternative would be to follow the discrete choice ap-
proach (e.g. McFadden and Ruud 2000) of treating the different potential cartel agreements as different 
“products” in a choice set, from which each cartel chooses the one that maximizes its utility. This alterna-
tive is not available to us, because the size of the choice set is large relative to the number of cartels we 
observe.  
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number of cartel members in the sample is 4 (see Appendix 1). About 44% of the cartels 
operate in an industry that produces homogenous goods.  
 We also control for other industry characteristics and the state of the macroecon-
omy at the time of writing the contract. The industry characteristics are the gross value 
of production (GVP), the (raw) material cost divided by GVP, the ratio of blue-collar 
hours to GVP, and the number of plants in the industry, all measured at the 4-digit in-
dustry classification of the cartel. All industry variables are measured one year prior to 
the cartel registering. We include the following macro variables: HP-filtered GDP and 
the absolute values of the positive and negative shocks to GDP. By using these three 
variables we can separately control for the level of GDP and positive and negative 
shocks to GDP. We also include the year of registration to capture unobserved time-
specific determinants of cartel contracts.25  
 Tables 6 and 7 present the average marginal effects for cartel size and the homog-
enous industry dummy for the MPA clauses and the ICC, ICO, EEC clauses, respective-
ly (for the marginal effects of the economic- and industry variables, see Appendix 3). In 
both tables, the regressions in Panel A only include the number of cartel members and 
Homogenous_d as the explanatory variables. For Panel B, we include the other control 
variables.   
[TABLES 6 and 7 HERE] 
Cartel size 
Market allocation is uncorrelated, Pricing positively correlated (though not when con-
trols are used) and Non-Comp-Tech negatively associated with cartel size. This suggests 
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 We lack information on the number of members for two (pricing) cartels and on a small number of 
industry characteristics at the four digit industry level. To keep the sample unchanged, we use imputed 
values. For the industry characteristics, they are the predicted value of the 4-digit value, the prediction 
taken from a regression of the 4-digit value of the industry characteristic on the 2-digit value, measured in 
the same year. For those couple of observations where we also lack the 2-digit information and for the 
two pricing cartels, we use the (4-digit) median. Our qualitative results are robust to excluding the con-
trols with missing values or to excluding the two pricing cartels with missing values from the estimating 
sample. 
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that the way in which a cartel decides to increase profits and, by implication, its chosen 
contracting approach, is related to the number of cartel members. 
Turning to the instability clauses, we find (from the last three columns of Table 6) 
that the three economic dimensions (ICC, ICO, ECC) are significantly and positively 
affected by cartel size. As Table 7 shows, the picture is somewhat richer at the level of 
individual clauses. In particular, the number of members is positively and significantly 
correlated with many ICO clauses and with New members -clause, but negatively with 
Non-cartel supply and Entry. These correlations are intuitive: Large cartels have devel-
oped rules for new members, and are less worried about entry and supply outside the 
cartel.  
Product differentiation 
The homogenous goods-dummy is significantly positively associated with the use of 
Market allocation (Table 6). The association is less clear and less robust with the rest of 
the clauses. In the raw data, 77% of the Market allocation cartels are found in homoge-
nous goods industries (see Appendix 1).  
 The relation between the homogenous goods-dummy and various ICC, ICO and 
ECC clauses is, in general, weak. As Table 7 shows, an exception to this pattern is that 
the homogenous goods-dummy is positively and significantly associated with ICC 
clauses Monitoring and Enforcement, irrespectively of whether the controls are included 
or not.  
6.2 Conditional correlations  
Here we redo the correlation analysis of the previous section (i.e., Tables 4 and 5) by 
studying the matrix of correlation coefficients between the generalized residuals of the 
estimated Probit models. This conditional correlation analysis allows us to check the 
extent to which the unconditional correlation structure between the various contract 
clauses is explained by the observables. 
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 The correlations of the generalized residuals are displayed in Table 8. We have 
two main findings. First, the qualitative correlation structure across the MPA clauses 
stays more or less the same. Second, the relations between the MPA clauses and the 
instability clauses change. The unconditional correlations (Table 5) suggested many 
systematic patterns across each of the three most commonly used MPA clauses and the 
instability clauses. Now these patterns disappear or get weaker: In particular, after con-
ditioning, Pricing is less correlated with ICC, ICO and ECC, but the corresponding cor-
relations with Market allocation are largely unchanged. Non-competition/specialization 
is still negatively correlated with ICO, but is not as correlated with ICC and ECC any-
more. It is important to note that when we exclude the number of members and Homog-
enous_d from the Probit specifications, the correlations between the generalized residu-
als are again close to the unconditional correlations. This suggests that the correlations 
in the raw contract clause data were driven by these two observable characteristics. 
[TABLE 8 HERE] 
6.3 Summary of the heterogeneity in cartel contracts 
We find that the size of the cartel is associated with the choice of how to raise profits, 
being (weakly) positively correlated with the use of Pricing, negatively with the amal-
gam of Non-Comp-Tech, and uncorrelated with Market Allocation. The homogenous 
goods-dummy is positively correlated with Market Allocation. Cartel size is mostly pos-
itively associated with the use of instability clauses in ICC, ICO and ECC.  
The relationship between the three most commonly used MPA clauses is robust to 
cartel-/industry heterogeneity and business cycle conditions. However, the relations 
between the three most commonly used MPA clauses and the instability clauses get 
weaker. It is thus the observables, in particular the number of members and the homog-
enous goods -dummy, that drive many of the unconditional correlations. 
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7 Complexity and stability of contracts 
The above results already speak to the variation in the complexity of contracts. In this 
section we explore further the complexity and stability of cartel contracts. We do so by 
regressing indicators of complexity and stability on a set of cartel and industry variables 
and by summarizing three case studies that we have conducted.  
7.1 Regression analysis 
We employ two measures of “complexity”: the number of clauses used by the cartel 
(mean = 5.60) and, following Taylor (2007), the length of the contract measured in pag-
es (mean = 3.32). Our measure of contract stability is the number of times the cartel 
registered a change of contract with the Registry (mean = 1, max=14). This measure is 
related to contract complexity and mirrors how stable the contracts were from a con-
tracting point of view, i.e., how the characteristics of the cartel, the initial contract, and 
the environment at the time the initial contract was registered affect the number of times 
the contract was changed.  
 Table 9 presents eight Poisson regressions that shed light on the complexity of 
cartel contracts. There are three dependent variables: the number of clauses in a con-
tract, the number of pages of the contract and the number of contract changes (see Ap-
pendix 1 for a distribution of the number clauses and contract changes). The explanatory 
variables include the number of members and the homogenous goods-dummy, as well 
as the same controls as used in the Probit models earlier. In addition to these, we in-
clude the MPA clause indicators and ICC, ICO and ECC -measures in some of our re-
gressions. 
[TABLE 9 HERE] 
Three main findings can be made from Table 9. First, the number of clauses is 
positively correlated with the number of members, suggesting that large cartels have 
more comprehensive and complex contracts (columns 1 and 2). The number of pages is 
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also positively correlated with the number of members, but this coefficient becomes 
insignificant when we include controls (see columns 3, 4 and 5). A potential explanation 
for the positive association is that an increase in the number of members raises the cost 
of relying on informal agreements as opposed to relying on formal contract clauses. 
Second, the degree of product differentiation is not correlated with the number of claus-
es, but cartels in homogenous goods industries have shorter contracts. These findings 
could be explained by homogenous goods industries having less need to contract on 
product characteristics and quality, as conjectured already by Stigler (1964). Third, as 
also the raw data suggest (see Appendix 1), we find that especially cartels using Market 
Allocation contracts write longer contracts. This suggests that these forms of coopera-
tion are more complicated than, e.g., the agreements to not compete or to specialize.  
Turning then to columns 6, 7 and 8 of Table 9, we find that the number of contract 
changes seems initially positively correlated with both cartel size and the homogenous 
goods-dummy. These results however disappear when we include controls. Pricing car-
tels and cartels that have Efficiency-clauses have significantly more contract changes 
and Non-Comp-Tech cartels fewer contract changes. The first result is not entirely sur-
prising, as some of the contract changes are about changes of prices. Market Allocation 
cartels are no different from the other MPA contract types.  
7.2 Case studies  
We have conducted case studies of one Pricing cartel (the match producers cartel), one 
Market allocation cartel (the cement cartel), and one Non-comp-Tech cartel (the ply-
wood box cartel). Our choice rule was to choose the earliest registered cartel in a ho-
mogenous goods industry that uses only one of the three aforementioned main MPA 
clauses. As we describe in more detail in Appendix 4, all these cartels used relatively 
short and simple contracts. This is consistent with the above results on contract com-
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plexity, as all three have a small number of members and are in homogenous goods in-
dustries.  
8 Discussion 
In this section, we discuss briefly three issues: First, do our results generalize to beyond 
the sample of 109 manufacturing industries and cartels? Second, how do our results 
compare to what is known about cartel contracting in other institutional environments 
and countries? Third, we discuss the relationship between legal and illegal cartel con-
tracts. 
 Our analysis has focused on the 109 nationwide manufacturing cartels that were 
the first registered cartels in a given (3-digit) industry. To check how representative this 
sample is, we use more limited information from a larger sample of 902 legal cartels 
from the same era. This sample covers both manufacturing and non-manufacturing (e.g., 
mining, retailing) industries and contains cartels that were registered later than the car-
tels in our baseline sample. The larger sample contains information only on the use of 
Pricing, Market-allocation, and Non-competition/specialization. In this sample, 96% of 
the manufacturing cartels use at least one of these three most common MPA clauses. 
Moreover, in the large sample, 37% of the manufacturing cartels use Pricing as opposed 
to the 58% of cartels in our sample; 27% use Market-allocation (27% in our sample) 
and 52% use Non-competition/specialization (39%). Two of the three correlations be-
tween these MPA-clauses are negative and significant (only the correlation between 
Pricing and Market-allocation is positive (0.03) and insignificant). The differences to 
the cartels outside manufacturing are larger: These use Pricing clearly more often 
(78%), and Market-allocation and Non-competition/specialization less often than the 
manufacturing cartels (6% and 22%). This seems plausible, because it is likely that re-
tailers and wholesalers use more frequently various pricing schemes, such as list prices, 
retail price maintenance arrangements, etc. There is thus a reason to think that non-
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manufacturing cartels use different contracts than manufacturing cartels, but within 
manufacturing our sample seems representative of the larger sample. 
Our findings augment those in the existing literature. Suslow and Levenstein 
(2011), using a sample of illegal international cartels report, that a much higher percent-
age (80% against our 27%) use market allocation, mirroring e.g. the need for delineation  
of the global market into national or regional markets. At the same time, earlier studies 
looking at illegal U.S. cartels report numbers very similar to ours.26 Further, in Leven-
stein and Suslow’s (2011) sample 31% of cartels involve a trade sales association (52% 
in our data; the older studies cited in footnote 26 report 29-44%). One third of their car-
tels adopt some compensation scheme, in our data, the clause Enforcement comes clos-
est; it is adopted by 12% of cartels. However, 31% adopt Expel and 15% adopt Fine.27  
Comparing the characteristics of the cartels in our sample to those studied by Har-
rington (2006) it is important to keep in mind that while we look at contract clauses, 
Harrington analyzes practices, and the two need not necessarily coincide. In any case, 
we find more heterogeneity. All cartels in Harrington’s sample agree on prices, and, 
though this is more difficult to judge, it seems that the cartels in Harrington’s sample 
used more complex organizations than the average cartel in our sample. The former 
could be the result of the international illegal cartels being unable to use market alloca-
tion, as it could have led to a higher detection probability. The latter may be explained 
by the fact that international cartels need a more complex organization than national 
cartels. 
Our contract characteristics are not easily compared to those recorded by Taylor 
(2007). Our results on the complexity of cartel contracts are however in line with his 
                                               
26
 See also Levenstein and Suslow 2006, Table II: Hay and Kelley (1974) report that 35% use market 
allocation; Fraas and Greer (1977) 26%, Posner (1970) 26% and Gallo et al. (2000) 27%. 
27
 ”Disciplinary or Coercive Practices” and/or “Exclusion” are adopted by 5% of the cartels in Hay and 
Kelley and by 12% in Fraas and Greer. 
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results. Using data on U.S. legal cartels from the 1930s (the National Industrial Recov-
ery Act), Taylor also found a positive but insignificant correlation between cartel size 
and number of pages, and no significant relationship between pages and degree of prod-
uct differentiation.   
As we already discussed, the cartels in our sample were legal, but apparently they 
hardly ever used the legal system to enforce their cartel contracts, nor was the enforcea-
bility clear ex ante. Thus, there were few reasons at the initial contracting stage to con-
sider the degree of verifiability of the various clauses in the court of law. Still we ob-
serve that they economize on the number of clauses. Using the terminology of Kaplow 
(2011a, pp. 803), the contracts we have studied can be seen as an exchange of promises 
and, perhaps, as a means to communicate the intended behavior of cartel members. It 
seems clear that the need of illegal cartels to conceal their agreements and behavior will 
lead to further endogenous incompleteness of contracts, because the participants have a 
strong incentive to strategically reduce the ability of a legal court to verify their concert-
ed actions (see Kvaløy and Olsen 2009 and also Kaplow 2011a, pp. 758-765). From this 
point of view one could think that the contracts we’ve studied are the type of contracts 
illegal cartels would like to write, had that no legal consequences. This means that ob-
served differences between contracts of legal and illegal cartels are likely to be due to 
the competition law regime that the latter face. The reasoning behind this statement is 
that the profit, incentive and organizational issues illegal cartel face, as well as those 
relating to changes in the external environment, are similar to those faced by the legal 
cartels that we have studied.  
9 Conclusions 
We have followed a four-step research approach to provide an anatomy of cartel con-
tracts. In line with the theory of endogenous incomplete contracts we find cartels to 
economize on contract clauses. We find three basic contracting approaches: cartels ei-
  
34 
ther agree on prices, allocate markets, or use some type of non-
competition/specialization clause to raise profits. These are gross substitutes and their 
correlation structure is not explained by the number of members in the cartel and 
whether the industry is producing homogenous goods. Choosing one of these approach-
es has implications to the rest of the contract.  
 Our key findings are the following: 
• Cartels that use Pricing clauses are the most common collusive scheme. Pric-
ing clauses are frequently combined with Non-price restrictions, such as 
clauses on add-ons, bundling and quality. Use of Pricing is positively corre-
lated with incentive compatibility (ICC) and organizational clauses (ICO), but 
negatively with clauses on external threats (ECC). However, these correlations 
get substantially weaker when they are conditioned on the number of members 
and whether cartel comes from a homogenous goods industry. In terms of con-
tract dynamics, contract changes are seen more often in Pricing cartels. 
• Cartels frequently use non-competition/specialization clauses, which often en-
tails coordination on the positioning in the product space (i.e., who specializes 
on what). The use of non-competition/specialization clauses appears to be 
more common than (pure) market allocation schemes, is associated with 
smaller cartels, and is often related to sharing of technological knowledge. 
These findings are consistent with the conjecture of Stigler (1964) about the 
many facets of collusive arrangements. When non-competition/specialization 
clauses are used, the cartel contract is updated less frequently.  
• Market allocation cartels use more often incentive compatibility (ICC) claus-
es, are more complex (use longer contracts) and are more likely to appear in 
homogenous goods industries. They are the least common of the three main 
contracting approaches.  
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Our findings suggest regularities in cartel contracts that can be exploited by competition 
authorities: In terms of deciding where to look for cartels and collusion (e.g. 
Symeonidis 2003) and, in particular, in terms of what types of concerted action or hori-
zontal agreements to expect and to search for. This knowledge should ultimately in-
crease the likelihood of courts making a proper ruling in cases involving price-fixing 
and other prohibited horizontal agreements (Kaplow 2011a,b).  
Our results suggest directions for future empirical and theoretical work: First, our 
results suggest that there are systematic differences in how collusion is organized in 
different types of markets, and by cartels of different sizes. These differences will with 
high likelihood have an impact on the behavior and effects of the cartel. This implies 
that testing collusive effects and different models of collusion would benefit from ex-
plicitly taking these systematic differences into account.  
Second, it seems fair to say that the existing theoretical literature has focused on 
monitoring and punishment schemes, but neglected the broader characteristics of how 
collusion is organized. For example, the prior literature has not systematically consid-
ered why and when various non-competition/specialization schemes provide a substitute 
for price-fixing or market allocation. Our results suggest that coming up with ways of 
avoiding competition through specialization or diversification in product space may 
become increasingly hard as the number of members increases. Moreover, our finding 
that cartels in homogenous goods industries are more likely to use market allocation 
begs for a theoretical analysis. A possible reason for the positive correlation could be 
that it is easier to divide markets e.g. geographically when the product is homogenous 
and thus more easily verifiable. Another explanation could be that many homogenous 
goods industries sell to other firms instead of consumers. In such markets prices aren’t 
necessarily observed, making it harder to monitor coordination on prices than, e.g., an 
agreement on spatial market allocation.   
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More generally, we believe that our results can be used to build models that in 
equilibrium deliver one of the types of cartel contracts observed in our data under the 
assumption that there is no competition authority. The environment can thereafter be 
changed (by, e.g., introducing a competition authority, modelled as a detection probabil-
ity and an associated fine) to study what type of a cartel agreement arises in the new 
equilibrium and how cartels adapt. 
 
 37 
References 
 
Ackerberg, Daniel A. and Botticini, Maristella, 2002, Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determi-
nants of Contract Form, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 110, No. 3, pp. 564-591.  
Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo, 1994, Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Na-
ture, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 4, pp. 1085-1124.  
Aoyagi, M., 2002, Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Com-
munication, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 102, pp. 229-248.  
Asker, John, 2010, A Study of the Internal Organization of a Bidding Cartel, American Economic Re-
view, Vol. 100, No. 3, pp. 724-762. 
Athey, Susan C., and Bagwell, Kyle, 2001, Optimal Collusion with Private Information, RAND Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 428-465. 
Athey, Susan C., and Bagwell, Kyle, 2008, Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks, Econometrica, Vol. 
76, No. 3, pp. 493-540. 
Athey, Susan C. and Stern, Scott, 1998, An Empirical Framework for Testing Theories About Comple-
mentarity in Organizational Design, NBER Working Paper 6600. 
Arora, Ashish, 1996, Testing for Complementarities in Reduced-form Regressions: A note, Economics 
Letters, Vol. 50, pp. 51-55.   
Battigalli, P. and Maggi, Giovanni, 2008, Costly Contracting in a Long-Term Relationship, RAND Jour-
nal of Economics, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 352-377.   
Battigalli, P. and Maggi, Giovanni, 2002, Rigidity, Discretion and the Costs of Writing Contracts, Ameri-
can Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 4, pp. 798-817. 
Bolton, Patrick and Dewatripoint, Mathias, 2004, Contract Theory, The MIT Press.  
Chang, Myong-Hun, 1991, The effects of product differentiation on collusive pricing, International Jour-
nal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 9, pp. 453-469. 
Chiappori, Pierre-Andre and Salanie, Bernard, 2000, Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance 
Markets,  Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 1, pp. 56-78. 
Cramton, P. C. and Palfrey, T. R., 1990, Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs, International 
Economic Review, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 17-47.   
Deneckere, R., 1983, Duopoly supergames with product differentiation, Economic Letters, Vol.11, pp. 
37-43. 
Dye, Ronald A., 1985, Costly Contracting Contingencies, International Economic Review, Vol. 26, No. 
1, pp. 233-250.  
Fellman, Susanna, 2008, Growth and Investment: Finnish Capitalism, 1850–2005, ch 5, in (eds.) Fellman, 
S., Iversen, M., Sjögren, H., and Thue, L., Creating Nordic Capitalism – The Business History of a 
Competitive Periphery. Palgrave-Macmillan. 
Fellman, Susanna, 2010, Competition policy in a coordinated market economy – Regulation of cartels and 
competition in Finland 1958-1988 from an institutional and economic-history viewpoint, Finnish 
Economic Journal, Vol. 106, pp- 141-161 [in Finnish].   
Foster, Lucia, Haltiwanger, John and Syverson, Chad, 2008, Reallocation, Firm Turnover, and Efficiency: 
Selection on Productivity or Profitability? American Economic Review, Vol. 98. No. 1, pp. 394-
425. 
Fraas, Arthur and Greer, Douglas, 1977, Market Structure and Price Collusion: An  Empirical Analysis, 
Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 21 – 44. 
Gallo, Joseph, Dau-Schmidt, Kenneth, Craycraft, Joseph, and Parker, Charles, 2000, Department of Jus-
tice Antitrust Enforcement, 1955-1997: An Empirical Study, Review of Industrial Organization, 
Vol. 17, pp. 75-133. 
Genesove, David and Mullin, Wallace, 2001, Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence 
from the Sugar Institute Case, American Economic Review, Vol. 91, No. 3, pp. 379-398. 
Gerlach, H., 2009, Stochastic Market Sharing, Partial Communication and Collusion, International Jour-
nal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 27, pp. 656-666.  
Green, Edward J. and Porter, Robert H., 1984, Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Infor-
mation, Econometrica, Vol. 52, pp. 87-100. 
Hanazono, M. and Yang, H., 2007, Collusion, Fluctuating Demand, and Price Rigidity, International 
Economic Review, Vol. 48, pp. 483-515.  
  
38 
Harrington, Joseph E., Jr., 2006, How Do Cartels Operate? Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics, 
Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 1-105.  
Harrington, Joseph E., Jr., 2004, Cartel Price Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority, Rand 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 651-673.  
Harrington, Joseph E., Jr., 2012, Exploring the Boundaries of Unlawful Collusion: Price Coordination 
when Firms Lack Full Mutual Understanding, manuscript, University of Philadelphia.  
Harrington, Joseph E., Jr. and Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2007, Collusion under Monitoring of Sales, RAND 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 314-331. 
Harrington, Joseph E., Jr. and Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2011, Private Monitoring and Communication in Car-
tels, American Economic Review, Vol. 101, pp. 2425-2449. 
Hay, George and Kelley, Daniel, 1974, An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies, Journal of 
Law and Economics, Vol. 17, pp. 13-38. 
Häckner, Jonas., 1994, Collusive pricing in markets for vertically differentiated products, International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 12, pp. 155-177. 
Hörner, J. and Jamison, J., 2007, Collusion with (Almost) No Information, Rand Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 804-822.  
Kaplan, Steven N. and Strömberg, Per, 2003, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An 
Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, Review of Economics Studies, Vol. 70, pp. 281-
315. 
Kaplow, Louis, 2011a, On the Meaning of Horizontal Agreements in Competition Law, California Law 
Review, Vol. 99, No. 3, pp. 683-818.  
Kaplow, Louis, 2011b, Direct versus Communicatyiopns-Based Prohibitions on Price Fixing, Journal of 
Legal Analysis, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 449-538.  
Kihlstrom R. and Vives, X., 1992, Collusion by Asymmetrically Informed Firms, Journal of Economics 
and Management Strategy, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 371-396.  
Kretschmer, Tobias, Miravete Eugenio J. and Pernias, Jose C., 2012, Competitive Pressure and the Adop-
tion of Complementary Innovations, American Economic Review. Vol. 102, No. 4, pp. 1540-70.  
Kvaløy, Ola and Olsen, Trond E., 2009, Endogenous Verifiability and Relational Contracting, American 
Economic Review, Vol. 99, No. 5, pp. 2193-2208. 
Lambertini, Luca and Schultz, Christian, 2003, Price of quantity in tacit collusion? Economics Letters, 
vol. 78, pp. 131-137. 
Lerner, Josh and Merges, Robert P., 1998, The Control of Technology Alliances: An Empirical Analysis 
of the Biotechnology Industry, Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 125-156. 
Levenstein, Margaret C. and Suslow, Valerie Y., 2006, What Determines Cartel Success? Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature, Vol. XLIV (March 2006), pp. 43-95.  
Levenstein, Margaret C. and Suslow, Valerie Y., 2011, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Determinants of Car-
tel Duration, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 455-492. 
Majerus, David, 1988, Price versus Quantity Competition in Oligopoly Supergames, Economics Letters, 
27, pp. 293-207. 
Marques, Jaime, 1994, Life Expectancy of International Cartels: An Empirical Analysis, Review of In-
dustrial Organization, No. 9, pp. 331-41. 
Marshall, Robert and Marx, Leslie, 2012, The Economics of Collusion – Cartels and Bidding Rings. MIT 
Press.  
McFadden, Daniel, and Ruud, Paul 1981, Mixed MNL Models for Discrete Response, Journal of Applied 
Econometrics, Vol. 15, pp. 447-470. 
Pesendorfer, Martin, 2000, A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions, Review of Economic Studies, 
Vol. 67, pp. 381-411. 
Posner, Richard, 1970, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 
13, pp. 365-419. 
Porter, Robert H., and Zona, J. Douglas, 1993, Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions, Jour-
nal of Political Economy, Vol. 101, No. 3, pp. 518-538. 
Porter, Robert H., and Zona, J. Douglas, 1999, Ohio School Markets: An Analysis of Bidding, RAND 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 263-288. 
Purasjoki, Martti and Jokinen, Juhani, 2001, Expectations, Achievements, and Challenges of Competition 
Policy, Borenius & Kemppinen 90-anniversary publication [in Finnish]. 
 39 
Raith, Michael, 1996, Product differentiation, uncertainty and the stability of collusion, Discussion paper 
EI/16, The Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. 
Rauch, James E., 1999, Networks versus markets in international trade, Journal of International Econom-
ics Vol. 48, pp. 7–35. 
Roberts, K., 1985, Cartel Behaviour and Adverse Selection, Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 33, No. 
4, pp. 401-413.  
Ross, Thomas W., 1992, Cartel stability and product differentiation, International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, Vol 10, pp.1-13. 
Rotschild, R., 1992, On the sustainability of collusion in differentiated duopolies, Economic Letters, Vol. 
40, pp. 33-37. 
Rotemberg, Julio J. and Saloner, Garth, 1986, A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars During 
Booms, American Economic Review, Vol. 76, pp. 390-407. 
Röller, Lars-Hendrik and Steen, Frode, 2006, On the Workings of a Cartel: Evidence from the Norwegian 
Cement Industries, American Economic Review, Vol. 96, pp. 321-338. 
Schultz, Christian, 2005, Transparency on the consumer side and tacit collusion, European Economic 
Review, Vol. 49, pp. 279-297. 
Shleifer, Andrei, 2005, Does Competition Destroy Ethical Behavior?. American Economic Review, Pa-
pers and Proceedings, Vol. 94, no. 2, pp. 414-418. 
Shleifer, Andrei, 2012, The Failure of Judges and the Rise of Regulators. MIT Press. 
Spier, Katharyn E., 1992, Incomplete Contracting and Signaling, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, 
No. 3, pp. 432-443. 
Stigler, George, 1964, A Theory of Oligopoly, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 72, pp. 44-61. 
Suslow, Valerie Y., 2005, Cartel Contract Duration: Empirical Evidence from Inter-War International 
Cartels, Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 14, no. 5, pp. 705-44. 
Symeonidis, George, 2003, In Which Industries is Collusion More Likely? Evidence from the UK, Jour-
nal of Industrial Economics, Vol. LI, No. 1, pp 45-74. 
Taylor, Jason E., 2007, Cartel Code Attributes and Cartel Performance: An Industry-Level Analysis of 
the National Industrial Recovery Act, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 597-624.  
Thomadsen, Raphael and Rhee, Ki-Eun, 2007, Costly Collusion in Differentiated Industries, Marketing 
Science, Vol. 26 No. 5, pp. 660-665. 
Tirole, Jean, 2009, Cognition and Incomplete Contracts, American Economic Review, Vol. 99, No. 1, pp. 
265-294. 
  
  
40 
Tables and Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The four-step research approach
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Economic dimension #1: Market Power Attributes (MPA) -- 6 clauses
  Pricing
  Market allocation
  Efficiency
  Technology
  Non-price 
  Non-comp./spec.
Economic dimension #2: Incentive Compatibility Constraint (ICC) -- 4 clauses
  Monitoring
  Enforcement
  Expel
  Fine
Economic dimension #3: Internal Cartel Organization (ICO) -- 5 clauses
  Meeting
  Dispute-resolution
  Structure
  Vote
  Sales
Economic dimension #4: External Cartel Contract (ECC) -- 3 clauses
  New members
  Non-cartel supply
  Entry
Table 1: Economic dimensions and contract clauses  
= 1 if the contract specifies a voting procedure.
= 1 if the cartel has formed either a trade or a sales association.
= 1 if the contract specifies a policy on how to accept new 
members.
= 1 if the contract specifies how to deal with supply from non-
member rivals.
Panel A: Variable descriptions 
= 1 if the contract stipulates whether, and if so, how often, the 
members are to meet.
= 1 if the contract specifies a way in which disputes among 
members are to be resolved.
= 1 if the cartel has a formal structure, such as an association or a 
limited liability company to organize itself.
= 1 if the contract refers to prices, pricing rules, discount rules 
and/or rules of delivery and payment.
= 1 if the contract refers to sales quotas or market shares, exclusive 
territories, or allocation of customers among the members.
= 1 if the contract stipulates, e.g., that sales and/or production 
should be allocated according to efficiency.
= 1 if the contract refers toabout sharing of technological 
knowledge such as patents or blueprints.
= 1 if the contract mentions any non-price restrictions, like add-
ons, bundling, and quality. 
= 1 if the contract stipulates that the members are to specialize in 
one way or the other, or agree to “not compete” in a given market.
= 1 if the contract has a clause on how the members monitor each 
other.
= 1 if the contract stipulates how to handle situations where a 
member has deviated or mentions price wars, retaliation, etc.
= 1 if the contract includes rules on how to expel a member if rules 
are broken.
= 1 if the contract includes clauses on monetary fines for a 
company that violates the contract.
= 1 if the contract stipulates how to react to entrants into the 
industry.
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# of cartels Freq. Max # of clauses Freq.
MPA 105 0.96 6 0.30
ICC 57 0.52 4 0.39
ICO 93 0.85 5 0.49
ECC 80 0.73 3 0.43
Notes: In sub-panel (i), we report the number of cartels and the associated frequency that use at
least one contract clause in each of the four economic dimension. In sub-panel (ii), we report
the average of the number of clauses used divided by the maximum number of clauses,
conditional on using at least one clause in the dimension.  
Any clause used? If used, how often?
Table 1, continued
Panel B: Usage  of economic dimensions 
Sub-panel (i) Sub-panel (ii)
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Contract 
design n Freq. Homogenous
MPA 
usage
ICC 
usage
ICO 
usage
ECC 
usage
MPA 
usage 
intensity
ICC 
usage 
intensity
ICO 
usage 
intensity
ECC 
usage 
intensity
1 42 0.39 0.50 1 1 1 1 0.30 0.38 0.58 0.38
2 29 0.27 0.48 1 0 1 1 0.32 - 0.39 0.46
3 9 0.08 0.56 1 1 1 0 0.30 0.50 0.49 -
4 9 0.08 0.11 1 0 1 0 0.33 - 0.36 -
5 9 0.08 0.44 1 0 0 0 0.22 - - -
6 4 0.04 0.25 1 0 0 1 0.29 - - 0.58
7 3 0.03 0.00 0 1 1 1 - 0.33 0.73 0.44
8 2 0.02 1.00 1 1 0 0 0.25 0.25 - -
9 1 0.01 0.00 1 1 0 1 0.33 0.25 - 0.67
10 1 0.01 0.00 0 0 1 1 - - 0.60 0.33
Table 2: Contract designs observed in the data
Notes: Sub-panel (i) reports which combinations of {MPA, ICC, ICO, ECC} are used in the data and how common they are. Sub-panel (ii)
shows how the contracts look like. Sub-panel (iii) reports the average of the number of clauses used divided by the maximum number
of clauses, conditional on using at least one clause in the dimension.   
Sub-panel (ii) Sub-panel (iii)Sub-panel (i)
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All Homogenous Non-homogenous
MPA clause Mean Mean Mean
  Pricing 0.578 0.525 0.646
  Market allocation 0.266 0.131 0.438
  Efficiency 0.083 0.098 0.063
  Technology 0.284 0.344 0.208
  Non-price 0.147 0.115 0.188
  Non-comp./spec. 0.385 0.426 0.333
# of cartels 109 48 61
Table 3. Prevalence of MPA clauses
Sample
Notes: The table reports the fraction of cartels that use the various MPA clauses for the
full sample, as well as for the cartels coming from homogenous goods and non-
homogenous goods industries.
MPA clause  Pricing Market allocation  Eﬃciency  Technology  Non-price
  Market allocation -0.116      1     
  Efficiency -0.216**  0.272*** 1   
  Technology -0.532*** 0.082       0.180*    1    
  Non-price 0.302*** 0.044        -0.124       -0.147      1     
  Non-comp./spec. -0.698*** 0.035        0.310*** 0.546*** -0.222**
Table 4. Unconditional correlations of MPA clauses
Notes: The table reports pairwise correlations for the MPA clauses. Stars ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively.
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Figure 2: Most frequent combinations of the MPA clauses 
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 Pricing Market allocation  Eﬃciency  Technology  Non-price Non-comp/spec.
ICC (count) 0.236** 0.448*** 0.022 -0.151 -0.002 -0.368***
ICC_1 ( =1 if ICC > 0; 0 otherwise) 0.262*** 0.284*** 0.020 -0.212** -0.019 -0.414***
  Monitoring 0.173* 0.443*** -0.012 -0.114 0.011 -0.266***
  Enforcement 0.085 0.483*** 0.198** -0.044 0.087 -0.175*
  Expel 0.215** -0.002 -0.058 -0.117 -0.111 -0.289***
  Fine 0.09 0.279*** -0.030 -0.089 0.048 -0.169*
ICO (count) 0.317*** 0.226** 0.050 -0.236*** -0.012 -0.370***
ICO_1 ( =1 if ICC > 0; 0 otherwise) -0.0395 0.132 0.124 0.089 -0.048 0.009
  Meeting -0.014 0.121 0.152 -0.115 -0.124 0.036
  Dispute-resolution -0.357*** 0.339*** 0.233** 0.278*** 0.001 0.304***
  Structure 0.316*** 0.074 -0.054 -0.251*** -0.145 -0.371***
  Vote 0.436*** 0.082 -0.070 -0.284*** 0.042 -0.412***
  Sales 0.486*** 0.076 -0.047 -0.334*** 0.137 -0.565***
ECC (count) -0.293*** 0.086 0.028 0.293*** -0.111 0.263***
ECC_1 ( = 1 if ECC > 0, 0 otherwise)  -.178* 0.034 -0.046 0.195** -0.044 0.093
  New members 0.395*** -0.082 -0.095 -0.406*** -0.055 -0.500***
  Non-cartel supply -0.529*** 0.212** 0.155 0.587*** -0.032 0.561***
  Entry -0.380*** -0.015 -0.030 0.313*** -0.099 0.417***
Table 5. Unconditional correlations between MPA clauses and other economic dimensions
Notes: The table reports for each MPA clause, pairwise correlations with ICC, ICO and ECC as well as with the individual clauses of which they consist. Stars ***,
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively.
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Panel A - Probit  Pricing Market allocation  Eﬃciency  Technology  Non-price Non-comp/spec.  ICC  ICO  ECC
Log(members) 0.201*** -0.032 -0.080* -0.202*** -0.037 -0.316*** 0.257*** 0.085** 0.076*
(0.053) (0.030) (0.042) (0.072) (0.028) (0.072) (0.032) (0.036) (0.039)
Homogenous_d 0.134* 0.281*** -0.038 -0.128 0.066 -0.084 0.118 0.005 0.033
(0.075) (0.067) (0.065) (0.084) (0.058) (0.088) (0.078) (0.065) (0.059)
Control variables NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Pseudo R2 0.189 0.111 0.101 0.193 0.029 0.353 0.262 0.063 0.032
Chi2-test_#1 <0.01 <0.01 0.110 0.079 0.103 0.018 <0.01 0.025 0.140
Observations 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
Panel B - Probit  Pricing Market allocation  Eﬃciency  Technology  Non-price Non-comp/spec.  ICC  ICO  ECC
Log(members) 0.041 -0.059 -0.086** -0.105*** -0.070** -0.134** 0.261*** 0.195*** 0.159***
(0.038) (0.042) (0.040) (0.038) (0.029) (0.053) (0.038) (0.048) (0.038)
Homogenous_d 0.015 0.219*** -0.066 -0.035 -0.052 -0.028 0.125 0.003 0.116**
(0.061) (0.067) (0.062) (0.072) (0.071) (0.095) (0.098) (0.059) (0.057)
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Pseudo R2 0.413 0.174 0.286 0.432 0.422 0.561 0.312 0.322 0.198
Chi2-test_#1 0.552 <0.01 0.088 0.027 0.047 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Chi2-test_#2 <0.01 0.024 0.022 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.011 <0.01 <0.01
Observations 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
Table 6. Marginal effects of MPA contract clauses and ICC, ICO and ECC
Notes: The table reports Probit marginal effects and standard errors (in parenthesis). Stars ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and
10 % levels, respectively. Chi2-test_#1 tests the joint significance of Log(members) and Homogenous_d. Chi2-test_#2 tests the joint significance of the
control variables. 
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Panel A
Moni-
toring
Enforce-
ment Expel Fine Meeting
Dispute-
resolution Structure Vote Sales
New
 member
Non-cartel
 supply Entry
Log(members) 0.049* -0.006 0.203*** 0.022 -0.016 -0.055* 0.181*** 0.196*** 0.227*** 0.234*** -0.242*** -0.095***
(0.026) (0.015) (0.016) (0.022) (0.021) (0.029) (0.038) (0.037) (0.042) (0.032) (0.053) (0.025)
Homogenous_d 0.231*** 0.154*** -0.073 -0.001 -0.000 0.112 -0.071 -0.015 0.004 -0.072 0.009 0.070
(0.063) (0.052) (0.059) (0.055) (0.057) (0.102) (0.074) (0.061) (0.096) (0.073) (0.081) (0.067)
Control variables NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Pseudo R2 0.098 0.084 0.419 0.0082 0.008 0.027 0.198 0.199 0.218 0.395 0.221 0.109
Chi2-test_#1 <0.01 0.0189 <0.01 0.574 0.723 0.078 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Observations 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
Panel B
Moni-
toring
Enforce-
ment Expel Fine Meeting
Dispute-
resolution Structure Vote Sales
New
 member
Non-cartel
 supply Entry
Log(members) -0.040 -0.056** 0.322*** -0.013 -0.002 0.030 0.252*** 0.197*** 0.121*** 0.217*** -0.121*** -0.032
(0.030) (0.023) (0.046) (0.022) (0.015) (0.021) (0.037) (0.042) (0.046) (0.032) (0.040) (0.019)
Homogenous_d 0.189*** 0.099** -0.052 -0.029 -0.043 0.087 -0.136* -0.073 -0.130 -0.109* 0.093 0.132*
(0.046) (0.041) (0.075) (0.057) (0.059) (0.086) (0.080) (0.065) (0.101) (0.065) (0.076) (0.073)
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Pseudo R2 0.260 0.236 0.509 0.062 0.265 0.176 0.299 0.269 0.348 0.412 0.363 0.201
Chi2-test_#1 <0.01 0.013 <0.01 0.465 0.796 0.307 <0.01 <0.01 0.066 <0.01 <0.01 0.104
Chi2-test_#2 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.077 0.296 <0.01 0.214 0.080 <0.01 0.105 <0.01 <0.01
Observations 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
Table 7. Marginal effects of ICC, ICO and ECC contract clauses
Notes: The table reports Probit marginal effects and standard errors (in parenthesis). Stars ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, 
respectively. Chi2-test_#1 tests the joint significance of Log(members) and Homogenous_d. Chi2-test_#2 tests the joint significance of the control variables. The
regression for Entry is an OLS regression (Linear Probability Model), due to Log(members) being a perfect predictor for Entry = 1 in the Probit. 
ICC ICO ECC
ICC ICO ECC
 49
 
 
 
Residual of:  Pricing Market allocation  Eﬃciency  Technology  Non-price Non-comp/spec.
  Market allocation -0.259*** 1.000
  Efficiency -0.033 0.286*** 1.000
  Technology -0.249*** 0.225** 0.030 1.000
  Non-price 0.171* -0.064 -0.050 0.026 1.000
  Non-comp./spec. -0.448*** 0.154 0.154 0.295*** -0.102 1.000
ICC_1 -0.035 0.302*** 0.100 0.060 0.037 -0.032
  Monitoring -0.010 0.338*** 0.040 -0.014 -0.022 -0.032
  Enforcement -0.024 0.404*** 0.231** 0.055 -0.017 -0.020
  Expel -0.067 0.148 0.039 0.104 0.058 0.051
  Fine 0.013 0.292*** 0.022 -0.001 0.064 -0.091
ICO_1 0.042 0.151 0.124 0.121 0.062 0.055
  Meeting 0.137 0.064 0.161* -0.166* -0.085 -0.119
  Dispute-resolution -0.269*** 0.322*** 0.132 0.224** 0.115 0.155
  Structure 0.159* 0.171* 0.108 -0.082 -0.226** -0.209**
  Vote 0.271*** 0.148 0.143 -0.061 0.020 -0.234**
  Sales 0.190** 0.058 0.104 -0.037 0.071 -0.352***
ECC_1 -0.151 0.066 -0.116 0.142 0.180* 0.084
  New members 0.156 -0.057 0.102 -0.213** 0.067 -0.243**
  Non-cartel supply -0.227** 0.289*** -0.017 0.377*** 0.043 0.272***
  Entry -0.105 -0.040 -0.160* 0.059 -0.014 0.053
Notes: The data refer to generalized residuals from the Probit models. The table reports for the residuals of each MPA clause, pairwise correlations with
the corresponding residuals for ICC, ICO and ECC as well as for the individual clauses of which they consist. Stars ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively.
Table 8. Correlations of generalized residuals of MPA clauses and other economic dimensions
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Table 9. Contract complexity and stability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables #clauses #clauses #pages #pages #pages #changes #changes #changes
  Log(members) 0.086*** 0.100*** 0.132*** 0.077 0.086 0.262*** 0.103 0.003
(0.018) (0.029) (0.042) (0.054) (0.077) (0.082) (0.137) (0.147)
  Homogenous_d 0.104 0.053 0.020 -0.166** -0.155** 0.445** 0.186 0.063
(0.084) (0.075) (0.074) (0.081) (0.067) (0.175) (0.228) (0.246)
  Pricing - - - 0.342** 0.189 - 1.244*** 1.065***
(0.152) (0.144) (0.449) (0.363)
  Market allocation - - - 0.343*** 0.352*** - 0.261 0.264
(0.119) (0.108) (0.293) (0.360)
  Efficiency - - - 0.191 -0.037 - 1.044*** 1.211**
(0.118) (0.128) (0.402) (0.574)
  Technology - - - -0.046 -0.187 - 0.225 0.097
(0.109) (0.123) (0.322) (0.466)
  Non-price - - - 0.206* 0.204* - -0.476 -0.896**
(0.122) (0.115) (0.322) (0.411)
  Non-comp./spec. - - - -0.028 0.096 - -1.113** -1.047*
(0.106) (0.105) (0.548) (0.582)
  ICC_1 (= 1 if ICC > 0) - - - 0.151* 0.169* - 0.180 -0.064
(0.086) (0.093) (0.313) (0.338)
  ICO_1 (= 1 if ICO > 0) - - - 0.133 0.281** - -0.217 -0.018
(0.159) (0.136) (0.333) (0.348)
  ECC_1 (= 1 if ECC > 0) - - - -0.063 -0.094 - -0.392 -0.176
(0.127) (0.128) (0.283) (0.192)
Controls No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
Notes: The table reports marginal effects and standard errors (in parenthesis). The standard errors are clustered by the registration year.
Stars ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively.
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Appendix for online publication 
 
Appendix 1: Further descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
Members Duration   Pages
Homogenous 
goods
# Contract 
changes # Clauses
All cartels 4 5 3 0.44 1 6
Conditioning variable
MPA 4 5 3 0.457 1.029 6
  Pricing 7 2 3 0.492 1.524 6
  Market allocation 3 5 4 0.724 1.138 8
  Efficiency 2 5 4 0.333 0.889 7
  Technology 2 5 3 0.322 0.452 5
  Non-price 4 1.5 4 0.556 0.938 6.5
  Non-comp./spec. 2 5 2 0.381 0.286 5
ICC 7.5 5 3 0.491 1.333 7
ICO 5 5 3 0.441 0.968 6
ECC 4 5 3 0.45 0.863 6
Table A1. Conditional medians/means of cartel characteristics
Notes: The numbers presented are the medians of the column variables, conditional on the row
variable taking the value one. For homogenous goods and # of contract changes we report the
mean.
Count of clauses or contract changes clauses  contract changes
0 - 58
1 6 17
2 5 19
3 10 11
4 16 3
5 15 0
6 21 0
7 15 0
8 9 0
9 5 1
10 4 -
11 1 -
12 1 -
13 0 -
14 1 -
Note: Column two displays the number of cartels with a given number of clauses (as
given in column one). Column three displays the number of cartels with a given number
of contract changes.
Table A2. The distribution of #clauses and # contract changes
# of cartels having:
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Appendix 2: Cluster analysis of contract clauses 
 
In this appendix, we report the results of a series of cluster analyses. The aim of cluster 
analyses is to determine the natural groupings in a data set. We use the approach to ex-
plore the robustness of the three main MPA approaches that we identify in the main 
text.  
 
We implement four types of cluster analyses. First, we cluster the data on observations, 
using both (agglomerative) hierarchical and partition clustering methods. These ap-
proaches determine, using individual cartels as the object of the clustering analysis, 
which cartels form natural groupings in the data. Using these groupings, we can then 
examine how the groups differ and, in particular, which MPA clauses the cartels in the 
different groups use. Second, we repeat the analyses using the two clustering methods, 
but with the twist that we examine directly the clustering of contract clauses. Here the 
object of the clustering analysis is the six MPA clauses (i.e., variables) and our interest 
is in understanding the natural grouping among them, given the contract data that we 
have.  
 
Agglomerative hierarchical clustering method results in a hierarchy of groups. It begins 
with single observations and proceeds by combining the closest two. This process is 
continued till all observations in the data are in the same cluster. Partition cluster meth-
od, instead, starts by breaking the data into a number of distinct groups. We use parti-
tioning method called kmeans, which is a commonly used partitioning method.  
 
The methods require that a distance measure for determining similarity is chosen. Simi-
larity measures for binary data ask whether for two observations (variables), the values 
taken by the variables (observations) match, in the sense that for the two observations 
(variables), there are many variables (observations) that are one or zero for both of them 
at the same time. We use the “matching” binary similarity coefficient, which calculates 
the proportion of matches between the two observations (variables). For the hierarchical 
clustering method, we also need a measure which determines when two groups are 
close. To this end, we use single-linkage and average-linkage clustering. The former 
uses the closest observations of groups to determine which the two closest groups are. 
In the latter, they are determined the average similarity.  
 
In all what follows, we fix the number of clusters to three or four. This choice was dic-
tated both by our prior views (based on the available economic literature on collusion) 
and the objective of our clustering exercise. We also explored with certain formal meth-
ods to determine the number of clusters. While not entirely conclusive, those did not 
disagree with our prior views.  
 
The results of the cluster analyses which use the cartels as the unit of analysis are dis-
played in table A3. The table shows that the cartels have a clear tendency to cluster so 
that Pricing and the amalgam of Non-competition/specialization and Technology can be 
identified as independent clusters, though the former appears sometimes together with 
Non-price. Market allocation is typically the most dominant MPA-clause in the third 
emerging cluster of cartel contracts, but both the size of the third cluster and its remain-
ing composition vary slightly, depending on the cluster approach used.  
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We can summarize the results of the cluster analyses of variables (clauses) verbally as 
follows: First, Pricing typically shows up as an independent cluster. If it does not, it is 
combined with Non-price. Second, Non-competition/specialization and Technology are 
grouped together, but never with the other MPA clauses. Third, Market allocation either 
forms an independent cluster, or is combined with Efficiency and/or Non-price. These 
groupings square nicely with those shown in table A3. 
 
 
Cluster Freq. Pricing Market 
allocation
Efficiency Technology Non-price Non-
comp./spec.
1 0.12 0.08 1.00 0.46 0.62 0.00 0.85
2 0.26 0.04 0.00 0.11 0.71 0.04 0.96
3 0.62 0.90 0.24 0.00 0.04 0.22 0.06
Cluster Freq. Pricing Market 
allocation
Efficiency Technology Non-price Non-
comp./spec.
1 0.58 0.94 0.17 0.00 0.02 0.21 0.06
2 0.02 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
3 0.40 0.05 0.36 0.20 0.64 0.02 0.86
Cluster Freq. Pricing Market 
allocation
Efficiency Technology Non-price Non-
comp./spec.
1 0.48 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.19 0.06
2 0.15 0.81 1.00 0.00 0.13 0.31 0.06
3 0.12 0.08 1.00 0.46 0.62 0.00 0.85
4 0.26 0.04 0.00 0.11 0.71 0.04 0.96
Cluster Freq. Pricing Market 
allocation
Efficiency Technology Non-price Non-
comp./spec.
1 0.58 0.94 0.17 0.00 0.02 0.21 0.06
2 0.02 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
3 0.32 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.66 0.03 0.86
4 0.08 0.22 0.67 1.00 0.56 0.00 0.89
Partitioning (kmeans), # of clusters = 3
Hierarchical, # of clusters = 3
Partitioning (kmeans), # of clusters = 4
Hierarchical, # of clusters = 4
Table A3. Results from cluster analyses
Notes: The table reports the size of the clusters and the frequency at which they contain 
different MPA clauses.
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Appendix 3: Industry- and macroeconomic effects 
 
This appendix reports further information on how we have used industry and macroeco-
nomic variables in the analysis. We report, in particular, how cartel contracts are corre-
lated with industry heterogeneity and the state of the business cycle at the time the cartel 
is formed. This is motivated by the old question of whether collusion is more likely to 
be sustained and initiated during booms or busts (see, e.g., Green and Porter 1984, 
Rotemberg and Saloner 1986, Marques 1994 and Suslow 2005). 
 
The industry and macroeconomic variables are defined in detail in the main text, so we 
do not repeat them here for brevity. However, it should be noted that for a small number 
of industries, we miss one or the other industry characteristic. For these, we use an im-
puted value, which is the predicted value of the 4-digit value, the prediction taken from 
a regression of the 4-digit value of the industry characteristic on the 2-digit value, 
measured in the same year. For those couple of observations where we also lack the 2-
digit information, we use the 4-digit median. Our results are robust to excluding the 
observations with missing industry characteristics or, where possible, to including a 
separate dummy (replace_d) for these imputed observations. We can include it in all but 
those equations where the outcome variable has no variation conditional on replace_d 
taking value one (or zero). To keep the specification unchanged across the columns, the 
results reported below do not, however, include this dummy,  
 
Tables A4-A6 report the marginal effects for the macro- and industry heterogeneity con-
trols for Tables 6, 7 and 9 reported in the main text. Table A4 and A5 reports how the 
industry characteristics and macroeconomic variables are associated with the four eco-
nomic dimensions and the clauses of which they consist, as well as with ICC, ICO and 
ECC. Table A6 reports how the industry characteristics and macroeconomic variables 
are associated with contract complexity and changes. 
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 Pricing Market allocation  Eﬃciency  Technology  Non-price Non-comp/spec.  ICC  ICO  ECC
Log(members) 0.041 -0.059 -0.086** -0.105*** -0.070** -0.134** 0.261*** 0.195*** 0.159***
(0.038) (0.042) (0.040) (0.038) (0.029) (0.053) (0.038) (0.048) (0.038)
Homogenous_d 0.015 0.219*** -0.066 -0.035 -0.052 -0.028 0.125 0.003 0.116**
(0.061) (0.067) (0.062) (0.072) (0.071) (0.095) (0.098) (0.059) (0.057)
Hp_trend -0.652** -0.243 - -0.065 -0.287 0.076 0.072 0.660 -0.133
(0.332) (0.367) (0.218) (0.331) (0.299) (0.324) (0.415) (0.315)
Gdp_neg -0.598** 0.147 0.471* 0.974*** -1.703*** 1.205*** 0.133 -0.015 0.731*
(0.259) (0.524) (0.279) (0.257) (0.385) (0.368) (0.432) (0.310) (0.434)
Gdp_pos -0.587** -0.265 -0.058 1.266*** -0.639*** 0.129 0.168 -0.892** 1.436***
(0.282) (0.299) (0.205) (0.203) (0.172) (0.255) (0.238) (0.414) (0.526)
Material share -0.024 -0.395 0.334* -0.328* -0.320*** 0.307 -0.145 -0.432* -0.262
(0.314) (0.279) (0.177) (0.178) (0.115) (0.244) (0.292) (0.247) (0.267)
Hours -0.223 -0.754 -1.668 3.236** -5.464*** 3.768*** -2.792** -0.051 1.626
(2.182) (2.163) (1.862) (1.579) (2.079) (1.309) (1.331) (1.617) (1.200)
Gvp 0.001 0.025*** 0.007 0.005 -0.011 -0.016** 0.026* 0.008 0.002
(0.011) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013)
Plants -0.010 -0.054 -0.003 0.029 -0.020 -0.039 -0.029 -0.021 -0.003
(0.030) (0.041) (0.013) (0.023) (0.029) (0.041) (0.043) (0.034) (0.032)
Reg. birth 0.143* 0.056 -0.001 0.026 0.054 0.006 -0.021 -0.140 0.052
(0.083) (0.098) (0.004) (0.060) (0.084) (0.075) (0.085) (0.105) (0.088)
Observations 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
Table A4. Marginal effects of MPA contract clause and other economic dimension probit regressions
Notes: The table reports Probit marginal effects and standard errors (in parenthesis). Stars ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and
10 % levels, respectively.
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Moni-
toring
Enforce-
ment Expel Fine Meeting
Dispute-
resolution Structure Vote Sales
New
 member
Non-cartel
 supply Entry
Log(members) -0.040 -0.056** 0.322*** -0.013 -0.002 0.030 0.252*** 0.197*** 0.121*** 0.217*** -0.121*** -0.032
(0.030) (0.023) (0.046) (0.022) (0.015) (0.021) (0.037) (0.042) (0.046) (0.032) (0.040) (0.019)
Homogenous_d 0.189*** 0.099** -0.052 -0.029 -0.043 0.087 -0.136* -0.073 -0.130 -0.109* 0.093 0.132*
(0.046) (0.041) (0.075) (0.057) (0.059) (0.086) (0.080) (0.065) (0.101) (0.065) (0.076) (0.073)
Hp_trend 0.102 -0.314 -0.215 0.093 -0.062 -0.568** 0.068 0.468* -0.217 -0.257 -0.236 -0.369
(0.336) (0.196) (0.222) (0.263) (0.139) (0.250) (0.292) (0.270) (0.345) (0.383) (0.196) (0.299)
Gdp_neg -0.424 -0.249 0.375 -0.228 0.208 0.679** -0.361 -0.228 0.133 -0.173 0.568** 0.375
(0.654) (0.263) (0.306) (0.345) (0.261) (0.341) (0.486) (0.439) (0.394) (0.441) (0.268) (0.303)
Gdp_pos -0.168 -0.379 0.404 0.020 -0.543** -0.292 -0.786* -0.897** -0.609 -0.334 1.683*** 0.459
(0.384) (0.356) (0.252) (0.340) (0.253) (0.495) (0.459) (0.416) (0.411) (0.403) (0.370) (0.469)
Material share -0.260 -0.336*** 0.146 -0.176 -0.237 -0.454 -0.366 -0.127 -0.335 -0.120 -0.191 0.016
(0.320) (0.122) (0.231) (0.249) (0.162) (0.358) (0.233) (0.321) (0.358) (0.207) (0.170) (0.166)
Hours 0.809 -0.023 1.482 -0.166 1.144 -2.660 -2.074 -3.500 -2.525 -0.275 2.324 1.339
(1.445) (1.360) (1.718) (1.967) (1.590) (2.608) (2.984) (3.785) (2.478) (2.203) (1.940) (1.653)
Gvp 0.042*** 0.018*** -0.023** 0.015** 0.010* 0.013 -0.030** -0.017 0.012 0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.009) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.005) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006)
Plants -0.023 -0.002 -0.018 -0.017 -0.113* -0.044 0.001 0.010 -0.065* -0.044 -0.006 0.019
(0.049) (0.023) (0.030) (0.035) (0.064) (0.036) (0.024) (0.032) (0.035) (0.029) (0.034) (0.026)
Reg. birth -0.045 0.070 0.074 -0.034 0.023 0.172** -0.011 -0.128* 0.033 0.066 0.078 0.117
(0.090) (0.051) (0.061) (0.071) (0.037) (0.070) (0.078) (0.073) (0.090) (0.102) (0.056) (0.078)
Observations 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
Notes: The table reports Probit marginal effects and standard errors (in parenthesis). Stars ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, 
respectively.
ICC ICO ECC
Table A5. Marginal effects of ICC, ICO and ECC contract clauses
 57
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables #clauses #clauses #pages #pages #pages #changes #changes #changes
  Hp_trend - -0.277 - - -1.416*** - - -5.075**
(0.404) (0.476) (2.186)
  Gdp_neg - 0.491 - - 0.458 - - 1.545
(0.593) (0.461) (2.780)
  Gdp_pos - -0.151 - - 0.620 - - 4.592**
(0.291) (0.453) (2.264)
  Material share - -0.439 - - -0.190 - - -1.260
(0.317) (0.358) (0.907)
  Hours - -0.301 - - -2.181 - - -20.051**
(2.734) (2.907) (8.188)
  Gvp - 0.009 - - -0.001 - - 0.003
(0.007) (0.009) (0.019)
  Plants - -0.026 - - -0.027 - - 0.058
(0.032) (0.047) (0.095)
  Reg. birth - 0.076 - - 0.353*** - - 1.156**
(0.109) (0.124) (0.527)
  Replace_d - -0.104 - - 0.351* - - -0.223
(0.125) (0.202) (0.500)
  Constant 1.520*** -146.301 0.948*** 0.626*** -686.137*** -0.735*** -0.795 -2,245.221**
(0.072) (212.786) (0.107) (0.123) (240.777) (0.261) (0.563) (1,023.449)
Observations 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
Table A6. Contract complexity and stability
Notes: The table reports marginal effects and standard errors (in parenthesis). The standard errors are clustered by the registration year.
Stars ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively.
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Appendix 4: Case studies  
In this appendix we provide short case studies of three cartel contracts: one Pricing, one 
Market allocation, and one Non-comp-Tech cartel case. Our choice rule was to choose 
the earliest registered cartel in a homogenous goods industry that uses only one of the 
three aforementioned MPA clauses. The cartels that emerged are the match producers 
cartel (Case #1), the cement cartel (Case #2), and the plywood box cartel (Case #3).  
Case #1: The match producers cartel 
Finnish match producers formed a pricing cartel as early as 1927. The cartel consisted 
of an informal (unregistered) association and the Match Industry’s Price Committee, as 
it was called. All Finnish match producers participated in this collaborative effort, but 
the number of members appears to have varied a little over time; at the time of registra-
tion, it had seven members. The cartel agreed on prices, discounts to wholesale custom-
ers and cash purchases. It also agreed on the size of match boxes, and on prices of dif-
ferent labels on the boxes, and therefore also Non-price takes values one. The cartel also 
decided that the contract would continue on a calendar year basis unless some of the 
parties discontinue it. The original contract contained no further clauses. When the car-
tel was contacted by the Registry in 1961, it stated as its objective the “organization of 
domestic sales of matches”. It also announced some changes to the earlier agreement 
that had to do with the pricing of different labels. The organizational form changed in 
1971 when the Finnish Match Association was formed – thus the value of Structure, 
which in our sample is derived from the contract at the time of registration, would have 
changed from zero to one in 1971. The Association took over the duties of the Price 
Committee. The cartel continued to fix prices, but now also had a written contract 
which is 3.5 pages long. The contract lists the members, states that there is to be an an-
nual meeting, and has rules on voting and exit. Moreover, the contract has a clause on 
dispute resolution; in case of a dispute the members would resort to arbitration by the 
Finnish Chamber of Commerce. The final correspondence between the cartel and the 
Registry is in 1986: a member of the cartel has sent a letter stating that the Finnish 
Match Association has not had any activities “for a number of years”. The Registry 
therefore decides to remove the cartel from the Registry as of 1986.  
The match producers cartel is an example of a relatively small pricing cartel in a 
homogenous goods industry. They got by for more than 40 years with a relatively sim-
ple and informal organization, and by only using a few clauses. It is notable that they 
did not agree on any type of monitoring at any point, not even in 1971 when they 
changed for a much more formal organization and added several clauses to their con-
tract. 
Case#2: The cement cartel 
The cement cartel is an example of a market allocation cartel in a homogenous goods 
market. The two Finnish cement producers’ cartel was registered in 1959. The firms 
announced that they had agreed to divide Finland geographically, with the smaller firm 
(whose market share was given as 35%) concentrating on an area that in the south was 
round the capital Helsinki, and extended to the north. The production facility of the 
smaller member was located (in 1959) west of Helsinki in the town of Lohja. Both to 
west and east of this area, as well as north of it was the designated area of the larger 
member (with a market share of 65%). The reason for this split of the market was the 
location of production facilities. The larger competitor had in 1959 a production facility 
in the south-eastern town of Lappeenranta, which allowed it to service eastern Finland 
with the lowest possible transportation costs (as lake transport was readily available). 
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The other production facility of the larger member was in 1959 in the south-west town 
of Parainen on the coast. This location allowed relatively cheap sea transport to the 
northern port of Oulu and thereby northern Finland was allocated to this member (as the 
other was not located on the coast). The firms also produced quicklime with 1959 mar-
ket shares of 20-50% for the larger firm and 20-40% for the smaller, depending on the 
type of quicklime.  
 There was further correspondence between the Registry and the cartel in 1966. 
The cartel declared that no essential changes in their operation had taken place, but noti-
fied the Registry that in parts of southern Finland both producers’ cement is offered. 
The declared market shares were now “circa 64%” and “circa 35%”. There is further 
correspondence in 1979, indicating that the market shares had remained much the same 
at  “circa 64%” and “32-36%”. The larger cartel member states in its letter that “the 
marketing areas of cement are determined by customer choices, driven largely by 
transport costs”. This cartel has the simplest contract observed by us, as they only 
agreed on geography-based market allocation.1  
Case #3: The plywood box cartel 
Two manufacturers of plywood boxes made an agreement in 1964 whereby one of them 
ceased the production of these products altogether. It also committed itself to not re-
enter the business for 15 years, and to neither sell nor allow the use of its machinery. 
Further, it committed to not reveal its know-how of plywood box production to any do-
mestic competitor. We therefore coded this cartel to use two more clauses besides Non-
competition/specialization: Non-cartel supply and Entry. As compensation the firm con-
tinuing production promised to pay a royalty on its plywood box revenues to the firm 
ceasing production. In the correspondence with the Registry the firms stated that this 
agreement did not result in a monopoly, and also asked for the Registry not to publish 
the clause on royalties. In 1981 the Registry approached the firms and they declared that 
the contract had not been extended, and that also the other firm had ceased production 
of plywood boxes. The cartel was therefore removed from the Registry. 
 
In sum, we find that all these cartels used relatively short and simple contracts. This is 
consistent with the results that we report in the main text, as all three have a small num-
ber of members and are in homogenous goods industries.  
                                               
1
 It turns out that in separate contracts, given different entry numbers by the Registry, the two firms 
agreed on discounts with their downstream retailers. In effect, they ensured a price-cost margin to their 
retailers through these contracts without agreeing on a final price for their products.  
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